THE UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

ANDRÉ CHÉRADAME

"FROM HAMBURG TO THE PERSIAN GULF THE NET IS SPREAD."

PRESIDENT WILSON'S FLAG DAY ADDRESS, JUNE 15, 1917.

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BY

ANDRÉ CHÉRADAME

AUTHOR OF "THE PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED"

"From Hamburg to the Persian Gulf the net is spread."
—*President Wilson's Flag-Day Address.*

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TO MY AMERICAN READERS.

For twenty-two years before the frightful struggle let loose upon the world by Prussianized Germany, I spent all my time and all that I could command of resources and intelligence in studying the Pangerman conspiracy by means of systematic investigations which took me into one hundred and seventy-seven cities of Europe, America, and Asia. It was my hope that by exposing the German plans I might give a timely enough warning of the approaching danger to make it possible that fitting action could avert war.

I did not succeed in gaining a hearing from those whom it was necessary to convince in Europe; but the long continuance and persistence of my efforts, evidenced by the works I published before 1914, prove conclusively that I am a man of peace, for I have done everything in my power to prevent war. Continuing my task in the same spirit, it is my wish at least to contribute toward the ending of this appalling conflict on such conditions that it can never be renewed. A decisive victory

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of the Allies which will make any aggressive return of Pangermanism impossible is the only way by which this end can be attained. Toward gaining this victory, by rejecting from the beginning the crafty manœuvres of the Berlin Government unceasingly renewed to divide and deceive the Allies, the deliberate and profound conviction of every citizen of the United States can accomplish much I have, therefore, brought together in this little book, written for you especially, a series of specific facts, easily verified, which should establish among you this certain conclusion:

> Germany no longer exists. In her place stands Pangermany, whose existence is incompatible with the independence of the United States and the freedom of the world.

September 10, 1917.

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THE UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA

CHAPTER I.

PANGERMANISM AND WILLIAM II.

I. The Pangerman doctrine.
II. The Kaiser, originator of the Pangerman plan.

I.

Pangermanism is a doctrine of purely Prussian origin, which aims at annexing, irrespec-



THE POLES IN THE EAST OF GERMANY

tive of race or language, all the various regions of which the possession is deemed useful to the power of the Hohenzollerns.

It was in the name of Pangermanism, a theory of usefulness based on sheer cupidity and arbitrary will, that Germany formerly

THE DANES IN PRUSSIA

took, and means to keep, the eastern provinces which should by right belong to the Slavs, since they still contain a population of about four million Poles.

It was in the name of Pangermanism that in 1864 Prussia seized that part of Schleswig which was entirely Danish.

It is still in the name of Pangermanism that

GERMANS AND NON-GERMANS IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

Austria-Hungary has long been coveted by Germany, although their own figures show that Germans are in a very small minority there, having only 12 million against 38 million of non-Germans.

As far back as 1844 the future Marshal von Moltke wrote: "We hope that Austria will uphold the rights and protect the future of

the Danubian countries, and that Germany will finally succeed in keeping open the mouths of her great rivers."* Inspired by this doctrine of rapine, the author of a pamphlet which was published in 1895, just twenty-two years ago, under the authority of the Alldeutscher Verband, a powerful Pangerman society which did its utmost to bring on the present war, after indicating the vast programme of future annexations, found it a natural conclusion that no doubt the newly constituted German Empire will not be peopled by Germans alone, but "they alone will govern; they alone will exercise political rights; they alone will serve in the army and navy; they alone will have the right to hold land; and they will thus be made to feel that they are a people of rulers, as they were in the Middle Ages. They will, however, allow inferior tasks to be carried out by the foreign subjects under their domination."†

Pangermanism means the absolute negation of the principle of nationalities, which was the noblest idea given to the world by the French Revolution. It may be summed up

*Von Moltke, *Schriften*, vol. II, p. 313.

† *Grossdeutschland und Mitteleuropa um das Jahr* 1950, published by Thormann & Goetsch, Berlin, 1895, p. 48.

as a system of international burglary, and of slavery imposed by Prussianized Germans upon other races.

II.

From this Pangerman doctrine sprang the military and political Pangerman plan, of which the originator and promoter is the Kaiser. Shortly after his accession in 1888 he made a speech which showed distinctly his Pangerman tendencies, and in his answer to a speech made by the burgomaster of Mayence, on August 28th, 1898, he said that he intended to keep inviolate the inheritance bequeathed to him by his "immortal grandfather," adding, "but this I can only do if our authority is firmly upheld in regard to our neighbors, *and to this end there must be united co-operation from all of German blood.*" On the 28th of October, 1900, at a reunion of officers, he declared, "*My highest aim is to remove whatever separates our great German race,*" and a month before, at Stettin, he said: "I have no fear of the future. I am convinced that my plan will succeed." In the Kaiser's mind this plan was summed up in the chief formula of the Pangerman doctrine, *From Hamburg to the Persian Gulf;* and to accomplish this object

he was resolved to bind Austria-Hungary and Germany together by increasingly closer ties. In order to make sure of his supremacy over the Balkan peoples he counted on the co-operation of such of their Kings as were of Germanic origin, as in Bulgaria and Roumania, or who would feel strongly the Germanic influences which he could bring to bear. Thus, in 1889, he married his sister Sophia to the heir of the throne of Greece, later King Constantine, whose Germanophile rôle it has been easy to follow.

The Kaiser had scarcely come to the throne before he conceived the scheme of flattering the Turks and Mohammedans, in order that he might seize the Ottoman Empire later, and make use of Moslems throughout the world as a menace to other Powers.

On November 8th, 1898, at Damascus, William II. pronounced the famous words of which the significance is fully apparent now that we have seen the German policy developed in Russia, in Turkey, in Persia, and in China, and have witnessed its efforts to stir up agitation among the Moslem populations: "May His Majesty the Sultan, as well as the 300 millions of Moslems who venerate him as their Khalifa, rest assured that the German

Emperor is their friend forever." In consequence of this adulation of the Red Sultan, Abdul Hamid, the Kaiser obtained, on the 27th of November, 1899, the first concession of the Bagdad railway, which, now that it is nearly finished, is an instrument of the German military offensive against Russia and England. The German naval and military leagues, which count their members by millions throughout the Empire, have always been encouraged by the Kaiser, and in return they have backed up his incessant demands for a larger army and navy. He also encouraged the formation of the Alldeutscher Verband, or Pangerman Union. This association has many important and influential persons among its members, and upon it rests an overwhelming responsibility for the outbreak of the present war. Since its foundation in 1894 it has organized thousands of lectures, and scattered millions of pamphlets spreading the Pangerman doctrine, with its lust of aggrandizement, among the German people. It was also through the Alldeutscher Verband that, with a view to the present conflagration, all Germans living outside the Empire were systematically organized; this was especially the case in Austria and in the United States.

As for the time of the outbreak of war, it was the Kaiser who determined it. After the Treaty of Bucharest, August 10th, 1913, the situation in the Balkan States and the political conditions in Austria, for reasons which I shall show in my third chapter, made him decide that the time had come to strike. From November, 1913, he was busy preparing for early hostilities; he knew that the widening of the Kiel Canal would be finished by July, 1914, and made his arrangements to fit that date. He dazzled the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, by visions of the great advantages which action in common would give to the Central Powers; he made the archduke a visit at Miramar, near Trieste, in April, 1914, and followed it up by another in June, at the castle of Konopischt. This time he had for his companion Von Tirpitz, since so conspicuous as the chief of German submarine piracy, and it was then that the main outlines of the combined action of the German and Austrian forces, by land and sea, were drafted.

The assassination of the archduke on the 28th of June made no difference to the Kaiser's plans; on the contrary, this murder was an excellent excuse for intervention against Serbia;

it precipitated events. War was declared on the 1st of August, just a few days after the completion of the Kiel Canal.

The criminal action of the Kaiser in fostering the Pangerman plan for twenty-five years, was thus revealed to the world. Moreover—and let there be no mistake about this—thanks to the Pangerman propaganda carried on by his express orders, when he came out for war he was supported in his decision not only by the leaders of German opinion, but by a very large majority of the German people.

Maximilian Harden explicitly acknowledged this when he wrote in the *Zukunft* of November, 1914:* "This war has not been forced on us by surprise; we desired it, and were right to do so. Germany goes into it because of her immutable conviction that what she has accomplished gives her the right to wider outlets for her activities and more room in the world."

* *Le Temps*, November 20th, 1914.

CHAPTER II.

THE PANGERMAN PLAN.

I. Its extension from 1895 to 1911.
II. The plan of 1911 regarding Europe and Turkey.
III. Its extension to Asia, Africa, America, and Oceania.
IV. General view of the German plan of world-wide domination.
V. The stages toward its fulfilment.

I.

The Pangerman plan was fundamentally established in 1895, but after that date events happened in the world which induced the Pangermanists to extend it further. Chief among these were: the tension between France and England because of Fashoda, in 1898; the defeat of Russia by the Japanese, in 1905; the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria with the approval of Berlin, in 1900; the agreement at Potsdam by which the Czar of Russia abandoned all opposition to the completion of the Bagdad railway, in 1910; and finally the Franco-German treaty of November 4th, 1911, by which France ceded 275,000 square kilometres of the Congo to the Germans, while allowing them to hold heavy

economic mortgages on Moroccan territory. All these were interpreted by the Pangermanists as signs that Russia, France, and England desired peace so much that they would keep it on any terms; and the Pangermanists concluded that their most ambitious hopes might soon be fulfilled. Thus the basic plan of 1895, revamped and considerably increased, became the plan of 1911.

II.

This plan of 1911 provided, in Europe and western Asia, for:

1. The establishment, under German rule, of a vast Confederation of Central Europe, comprising in the west Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg, Switzerland, and the northern departments of France to the northeast of a line drawn from the south of Belfort to the mouth of the Somme; to the east Russian Poland, the Baltic provinces of Esthonia, Livonia, and Courland, and the three Russian governments of Kovno, Vilna, and Grodno; to the southeast, Austria-Hungary. These three groups form a total of 1,182,113 square kilometres, with 94,323,000 inhabitants. In this Confederation the territory actually be-



longing to the German Empire only comprised 540,858 kilometres, with about 68 million inhabitants, and out of a total of 162

million inhabitants only 77 million were Germans, the other 85 million being of other nationalities.

2. The absolute submission of all the Balkan States (containing 499,275 square kilometres, and 22 millions of non-Germans) to the Central European Confederation, thus making them mere satellites of Berlin.

3. The political and military seizure of Turkey, which was to be compelled afterward to add to its dominions by the annexation of Egypt and Persia, the object being to put Turkey, with her 1,792,000 square kilometres, and her 20 millions of non-German inhabitants (to say nothing of those in Egypt and Persia), under a strict German protectorate.

This Germanic Confederation of Central Europe was to form a huge *Zollverein* or Customs Union. Treaties of commerce of a special character imposed on the Balkan States and on subjugated Turkey would have provided Great Germany with an economic outlet, and reserved those vast regions for her exclusively.

The Pangerman plan of 1911 may be summed up in four formulas: Berlin—Calais; Berlin—Riga; Hamburg—Salonika; Hamburg—Persian Gulf. The union of the three groupings—

Central Europe, the Balkan States, and Turkey —would have made Berlin the predominating influence over 4,015,146 square kilometres of territory, inhabited by 204 millions of men, of whom 127 million were to be ruled, directly or indirectly, by only 77 millions of Germans.

III.

It was intended that the Pangerman plan of 1911 should be made still more effective by important seizures of territory in all the other parts of the world. These forcible annexations shown on the map (p. 15) were set forth in Otto Tannenberg's work, *Greater Germany, the Work of the 20th Century*, published at Leipsic. The exceptional importance of this book cannot be disputed since *it bears the date of* 1911 and contains the exact programme of seizures to be effected in Europe and Turkey, just as they have already been carried out by the German General Staff. The territorial acquisitions in Asia, Africa, America, and Oceania, which Tannenberg proclaims would be the logical sequence of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf scheme, would most certainly be realized if the Allies should abandon the struggle before their victory was decisive.



WORLD-CONSEQUENCES OF THE HAMBURG-TO-THE-PERSIAN GULF PROJECT AS FORECAST BY THE PLAN OF 1911

Supposing them to do so, it is certain that after a treacherous peace the Allied peoples, exhausted morally and physically, facing the formidable armies of Pangermany, would be unable to oppose the colonial expansion of Great Germany (to which the Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan would inevitably lead) because they had already given way on an issue even more vital to them—that of the independence of Europe.

It must be added that this programme, of which the details are given below, was laid down by Tannenberg on the supposition, *counted on by the Berlin Government, that England would not go into the war.* In order to make sure of her neutrality, Tannenberg advocated dividing the colonies of the other European Powers between London and Berlin. Now, however, that England is fully in the struggle it is certain that in case of defeat the colonies Tannenberg assigned her would be taken from her, since she would be powerless to resist.

A summary of Tannenberg's predictions follows, and it is well to remember that the world-wide acquisitions which he assigned to Germany in 1911 are less than she will be able to attain if she succeeds in establishing her

scheme of domination from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf; if she does that, no organized force on earth will be able to curb the boundless ambition of Berlin.

In regard to western Asia, Tannenberg explains that Asia Minor, Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine, western Persia, and the greater part of Arabia would be put under the protectorate of the German Empire—that disposes of 3,200,000 square kilometres, with 16,500,000 inhabitants. Once masters of the shores of the Adriatic, of the Ægean, of the Dardanelles, and of Aden (and here they would be helped by their Panislamic propaganda), the seizure of Egypt, and therefore of the Suez Canal, would be inevitable. Germany, if she commanded these essential strategic points, would obviously be able to retake her colonies in Africa and Oceania: Togo, Kameroon, southwest Africa, eastern Africa, Kaiser Wilhelm Land, Bismarck Archipelago, the Caroline Islands, Marshall Islands, the Marianes and Samoa, making a total of 2,952,000 square kilometres, with 11,787,000 inhabitants. If the Allies should give way in Europe they could not prevent Great Germany from snatching — still according to Tannenberg's programme—the Belgian, Portuguese, and Dutch

colonies, namely, the Belgian Congo, Portuguese Angola, and the Dutch East Indies, with their 5,680,000 square kilometres and 57,306,000 inhabitants. Next would come the turn of the French colonies, the cession of which to Great Germany is foreseen by Tannenberg. These are Morocco, the French Congo, Madagascar, Mayotta and the Comores Islands, Réunion, Obok and its dependencies in east Africa, Indo-China, and the French islands of Oceania, making a total of 3,391,000 square kilometres, with 33,588,000 inhabitants. Tannenberg also informs us that the aim of German politics in China was the establishment of a zone of solely German influence on the whole lower course of the Yang-tse-Kiang and the Hoang-ho; that is to say, over that vast portion of China which forms the hinterland of Kiao-chau, with its total of about 750,000 square kilometres and 50 millions of inhabitants. He finally gives an exact enumeration of the various German protectorates which would be established in the southern part of South America, which is largely settled by Germans. A glance at the map will show these protectorates, as planned in 1911.

"Germany," says Tannenberg, "will take under her protection the republics of Argen-

tina, Chili, Uruguay and Paraguay, the southern third of Bolivia, so far as it belongs to the basin of the Rio de la Plata, and also that part

COLONIAL PANGERMANISM AND SOUTH AMERICA

of southern Brazil in which German culture prevails." That is to say, about 6,347,000 square kilometres, with 18,197,000 inhabitants.

"German South America," he concludes, "will provide for us, in the temperate zone, a colonial region where our emigrants will be able to settle as farmers. Chili and Argentina will preserve their language and their autonomy, but we shall require that German be taught in the schools as a second language. Southern Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay are countries of German culture, and there German will be the national tongue."

As in every other country, the preparations for carrying out the Pangerman plan in South America were conducted by the organizers of the movement most methodically.

In 1895, when Germany had decided what she wanted, she proceeded to make a list of all Germans on the face of the globe, in order to pick out from among them those who were most likely to prove useful tools for carrying out the Pangerman plan. The result of this registration of the German element throughout the world may be found in the *Pangerman Atlas* of Paul Langhans, published by Justus Perthes, at Gotha, in 1909.

These are the figures relative to South America: In Peru, in 1890, there were two thousand Germans; in Paraguay, in the same year, three thousand; in Colombia also three

thousand, and in Brazil four hundred thousand. In 1894 there were five thousand in Venezuela; in 1895 there were fifteen thousand in Chili and sixty thousand in Argentina; and in 1897 there were five thousand in Uruguay.

The Pangerman societies have carried on a vigorous propaganda among all these Germans, especially since 1900, and in Argentina and Brazil, which were intended to be the principal German protectorates, they were organized with particular care. The German law of July 22d, 1913, known as Delbrück's, which deals with nationality under the Empire and under the State, has greatly favored German organization in America, and it is important to know at least the gist of it, since it is full of significance, and marks the last stage of Pangerman organization prior to the war.

The second part of its article 25 runs as follows: "If any person before acquiring nationality in a foreign State shall have received the written permission of a competent authority of his native State to retain his nationality of that State, he shall not lose his nationality of the said native State. The German consul shall be consulted before this permission is granted."

From these words we can measure the depth

of German astuteness. According to this provision, a German may become a citizen of a foreign State, but if he obtains a written permission "from a competent authority of his native State," he still continues to enjoy, for himself and his descendants, all the rights of a German citizen, and may claim the protection of the German Empire.

As this provision is contrary to all general principles of international law concerning nationality, a German citizen who takes advantage of it is careful not to inform the foreign State whose nationality he has acquired of the highly peculiar situation in which he stands. Thus Germany was able to have, in every State, agents devoted to her aggressive policy, while these States were unaware of the danger to which this secret service exposed them. Apparently they had only to do with fellow citizens whom they had no right to suspect. It was only after many months of war, when their criminal actions compelled them to take off their disguise, that the power of these Germans masquerading under other nationalities appeared in all its formidable importance. In South America the German effort at colonization has for a long time been concentrated upon three Bazilian States: Parana, which has

sixty thousand Germans, Santa Catarina, where there are one hundred and seventy thousand, and Rio Grande do Sul, with two hundred and twenty thousand. In these rich provinces they preserve the language, the traditions, and the prejudices of the Fatherland, and are almost absolute masters. Only forty-seven thousand of them are still openly citizens of the German Empire; about four hundred thousand are apparently Brazilian citizens, but in virtue of the Delbrück law a large number have remained or become once more liegemen of the Kaiser. It may be noted that the budget of the German Empire included a sum of 500,000 marks for the establishment and maintenance of German schools in Brazil, and in 1912 Prince Henry of Prussia, brother of William II., landed at the port of Itajahy in the course of his cruise, to visit his fellow countrymen in Santa Catarina. Since the outbreak of the war the German game in Brazil has gradually been revealed; numerous rifle clubs were, in fact, societies for military drill, and dangerous enough to necessitate their disarmament.

Outside the three provinces mentioned above Germans are not numerous in Brazil, but they fill most of the principal posts in business

houses and banks. In the first period of the war these men, having established Germanophile newspapers published in Portuguese, were able to prevent Brazil from getting accurate information as to the origin and development of the conflict.

To sum up, the result of the Pangerman programme for countries outside of Europe would assure to Germany, under the form of colonies, protectorates, or zones of special influence, in Asia, 4,753,000 square kilometres, with a population of 83,490,000; in Africa, 8,906,000 kilometres, with a population of 46,850,000; in Oceania, 2,314,000 kilometres, with a population of 38,840,000, and in America 6,347,000, with a population of 18,197,000, making a total of 22,320,000 kilometres, having a population of 187,378,000.

IV.

If to these figures we add the 4,015,000 kilometres, with 204 million inhabitants which the Pangerman plan of 1911 intended to cover in Europe and Turkey, we find that the German project of universal dominion looks for a total, in round numbers, of 26 million square kilometres, with 390 million inhabitants.

These figures include at the utmost only 90

millions of Germans, properly speaking, who would thus exercise supremacy over 257 million belonging to other races. It must be clearly understood that the enormous possessions of Pangermany in both hemispheres would be strictly controlled from Berlin. A glance at the map on p. 15 will show that all the essential strategic points which command the seas of the world are included; besides the Adriatic, the Ægean and the Dardanelles, the Straits of Gibraltar from the side of Morocco would be controlled, the Strait of Malacca, also Cape Horn, Madagascar, and the naval bases of Oceania.

William II. was well aware that such a project could only become an enduring reality through the disappearance of all other great Powers. When he had finally decided on the Pangerman plan he was deliberately resolved on the destruction of five of these Powers. This essential truth must be kept firmly in our minds if we wish to understand the present war. Austria-Hungary was to disappear through absorption, disguised at its entry into the German *Zollverein.* A fierce aggressive war was to annihilate the military forces of France and Russia. To cripple England later would be an easy job with France and Russia

dismembered and impotent. As for Italy, it was intended that she should be a vassal State, and she was not considered capable of offering even a slight resistance to Pangerman ambition. It must be added that the plan of 1911 did not include war with England. When the Kaiser forced it on France and Russia in 1914 he did not believe that Great Britain would come in, or at least not immediately.

The initial German plan was upset by English intervention following on the respite gained by the splendid resistance of armed Belgium. But Germans are stubborn and crafty; by adapting themselves to new conditions thrust upon them, they have almost succeeded in carrying out, even now, their plan of 1911.

To sum up, the complete Pangerman plan aims at procuring for Germany all the means of domination by land and sea which would enable her to hold the entire world in the crushing grip of Prussian militarism brought to the highest point of efficiency. Not for a moment do the Pangermans pause to reflect on the criminality of this programme of universal slavery. "War," says Tannenberg with his monstrous cynicism, "must leave nothing to the vanquished but their eyes to weep with. Modesty on our part would be only madness."

It is a fundamental truth, of which I wish to convince my readers, that the Pangerman plan is solely and entirely based on the achievement of the scheme "from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf," which forms its backbone. If this is broken it falls to the ground, and the projects for German domination are frustrated forever. The principal problem which the Allies must solve, if they would insure their liberty and that of the whole world, is that of making the plan of "from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf" impossible.

V.

In order to establish the responsibility of Germany we need only show clearly the machinery for the realization of the Pangerman plan as it appears in the light of facts. For twenty-two years, from 1892 until war broke out, the Pangerman movement has developed with ever-growing intensity; a multitude of publications, giving full details of the Pangerman plan, have been scattered among the German people in order to excite in them the greed of conquest, and prepare them for the fight by the bait of plunder.

Two of these publications are particularly important: the pamphlet published under the

authority of the Pangerman Union, *Gross-deutschland und Mitteleuropa um das Jahr* 1950 (*Great Germany and Central Europe in* 1950), published by Thormann & Goetsch, S. W. Beesel Strasse, 17, Berlin, 1895, which gives the Pangermanist plan of that year; and the book by Otto Richard Tannenberg: *Gross-Deutschland, die Arbeit des* 20 *Jahrhunderts* (*Great Germany, the Work of the* 20*th Century*), which was issued by Bruno Volger at Leipsic in 1911, and which gives nearly all the information to be desired with regard to that year's plan.

The great importance of this Pangerman literature is incontestable, and the reality, the extent, and the successive stages of the Pangerman plan of 1911 are shown:

1. By the course which Germany has followed in her political and military operations since August 1st, 1914. Many have supposed that her object has been to obtain pledges of security, but it has really been to seize territory for annexation almost exactly in the manner set forth in Tannenberg's book in explaining the plan of 1911.

2. By the memorial presented on May 20th, 1915, to the German Chancellor by the League of Agriculturists, the League of Ger-

man Peasants, the Provisional Union of German Peasants' Christian Associations (now called the Westphalian Peasants' Association), the Central German Manufacturers' Union, the League of Manufacturers, and the Middle-Class Union of the Empire. The importance of this document cannot be overrated, for it was issued by the most powerful associations of the Empire, in which were included all the influential elements of the German nation, especially the agrarians and the ill-omened Prussian squires. Now, the object of that memorial was to demand all the annexations mentioned in the Pangerman plan of 1911 which had been made possible by the progress of military operations.

3. By the declarations made at the sitting of the Reichstag on the 11th of December, 1915. The Imperial Chancellor, Von Bethmann-Hollweg, said: "If our enemies do not submit now, they will be obliged to do so later. . . . When our enemies shall offer us proposals of peace compatible with the dignity and security of Germany we shall be ready to discuss them. . . . But our enemies must understand that the more unrelentingly they wage war, the higher will be the guarantees which we shall necessarily exact." One of the depu-

ties, Spahn, then explained the drift of the Chancellor's speech with still greater precision: "We await," he said, "the hour which will allow of peace negotiations framed to safeguard permanently, and by every means, including necessary territorial annexations, all the military, economic, and social interests of Germany through its whole extent."

CHAPTER III.

THE IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE WAR.

I. Why the Treaty of Bucharest suddenly became a formidable obstacle to the Pangerman plan.
II. How political conditions in Austria-Hungary inclined Germany to bring on the war.

Although the Pangerman plan is unquestionably the underlying and principal cause of the war, yet when William II. brought it on, in August, 1914, he did so for immediate and secondary reasons, a knowledge of which is necessary to a clear understanding of events.

I.

Up to 1911, when Tannenberg published the programme of annexations, all the important happenings had furthered the Kaiser's aims; but after 1912 very serious and quite unlooked-for obstacles arose to thwart them.

Chief among these was the new condition of affairs resulting from the Treaty of Bucharest, which was signed August 10th, 1913, ending the Balkan Wars of 1912–13. This treaty created in the Balkan Peninsula two

groups of States sharply opposed to each other. To the first belonged the beaten and sullen participants, Bulgaria and Turkey; the second was composed of those peoples who had profited by the fight, and were satisfied with the result, namely Roumania, Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece. These latter, because of their recent acquisitions, made at the expense of Turkey and against the will of Germany, to whom Turkey was already bound, leaned more and more toward the Triple Entente, while the conquered States, Turkey and Bulgaria, tended to uphold Germanism. Before the Balkan Wars the influence of the Entente was much less in the peninsula than that of Germany, but after the Treaty of Bucharest the tables were turned, and the Entente found support in that group of States which was most powerfully organized, and which, as the map shows, presented a solid barrier to the Pangerman plan in the East.

If peace had lasted a few more years the situation would have been consolidated, and this barrier would have been still more impassable; therefore Berlin determined to intervene. Serbia was unquestionably the pivot on which the new Balkan equilibrium turned; it was decided to destroy her without delay,

THE ANTI-GERMAN BARRIER IN THE BALKANS
AFTER THE TREATY OF BUCHAREST
August 10, 1913

and at the same time set fire to Europe, in order, by one swift stroke, to realize the plan of 1911. The Treaty of Bucharest was signed on August 10th, 1913. On November 6th of the same year the Kaiser told King Albert of Belgium, during a visit at Potsdam, that in his opinion war with France was near and unavoidable.*

II.

Not only were the consequences of the Treaty of Bucharest disastrous to Pangerman ambitions in the Balkan Peninsula; to the boundless fury of the government at Berlin they accelerated considerably the internal political evolution of Austria-Hungary, which of itself had already threatened to counteract all the German plans.

There are nine different nationalities in the Hapsburg Monarchy; these are divided among four races: Germanic, Slavonic, Latin, and Magyar—this last a peculiar race, of Asiatic origin. There are about 12 million Germans, four million Latins (made up of Italians and Roumanians), 24 million Slavs, and 10 million Magyars. Since 1867 the Germans and Magyars have agreed to exercise and main-

**L'Allemagne avant la Guerre*, by Baron Beyens, p. 24.



THE NATIONALITIES IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

tain supremacy for their own profit over the Slavs and Latins, *although these latter* (28 *million*) *outnumber them*, and have fought

hard for the last thirty years to obtain political rights in the Monarchy proportionate to the majority they possess of living human beings, taxable and conscriptable at will. These efforts have disquicted William II. and his Pangermanists in the highest degree. This is readily understood, for if the political power in the Hapsburg Monarchy were vested, as justice demands, in the Slavs and Latins, *who detest Prussianism*, that in itself would be the ruin of the Kaiser's plan for the economic absorption of Austria-Hungary, *and without this absorption he cannot carry out his inadmissible plans of exclusive influence in the Balkans and in the East.* His game has therefore been, especially since 1890, to say to Francis Joseph and the Magyars: "Above all, do not concede the claims of your Slav and Latin subjects. Keep up absolutely the Germano-Magyar supremacy. I will uphold you in the struggle with all my power." For a long time these tactics were successful, but a few years before the war they were on the point of breaking down.

The culture of the Slavs and Latins grew steadily, despite the cynical and ingenious obstacles put in their way by the Germans and Magyars; their national organization became

closer, and they had also the advantage of being more prolific than their political rivals. These reasons made it increasingly difficult for Francis Joseph and his henchmen at Bucharest to resist their enlarged demands.

The Balkan victories of the Slavs in 1912, and the success of Roumania in 1913, roused the Latin and Slav subjects of the Hapsburgs to the greatest enthusiasm, as in them they saw the triumph of the principle of nationality —their own cause. They persisted more than ever in demanding their rights from Vienna and Budapest, and the Germano-Magyars persisted in refusing them, although with waning energy. If peace had been maintained, the cumulative effect of the Bucharest Treaty would have made these claims irresistible, while Roumania, exulting over her annexation in 1913 of the Bulgarian Dobrudja, began to look upon Transylvania as a fruit ripe for the plucking at Hungary's expense, at a moment when all political signs pointed to an approaching radical transformation in the Hapsburg Monarchy. If all this had taken place the influence of Germanism would have been jeopardized in the Hapsburg Empire quite as much as in the Balkans.

Under the growing pressure of her Slav and

Latin elements, the partition, or at any rate the evolution toward federation, of Austria-Hungary would have become a necessity.

THE THREE BARRIERS OF ANTI-GERMANIC PEOPLES IN THE BALKANS AND IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

This federalism would not have affected the frontiers of the Hapsburg dominions, but it would surely have given political preponder-

ance to the more numerous and more prolific Slavs and Latins. Of these a very large majority were resolutely opposed to any alliance with Germany. The foreign policy of the Hapsburg Monarchy would have thus become progressively more independent of Berlin, and been drawn closer to Russia, France, and England. Germany would have been deprived of the artificial prop which the Germano-Magyar predominance at Vienna and Budapest had given her since the days of Sadowa, and William II. confronted by conditions opposing a barrier to his Oriental ambitions even more formidable than that created by the Treaty of Bucharest. The Kaiser, therefore, decided to make war at once.

The three determining causes in eastern Europe may be summed up in three lines:

1. The defeat of Turkey by the Balkan peoples and Italy in 1912.

2. The consequences of the Treaty of Bucharest.

3. The internal evolution of Austria-Hungary.

The three anti-German barriers are shown on the map (p. 38) by broad black strokes; these barriers would have effectually broken up the Pangerman plan, and the Kaiser, fore-

seeing this, had recourse to war, which Mirabeau pithily described long ago as "the national industry of Prussia."

CHAPTER IV.

PANGERMANY IS MADE.

I. The extent of the realization at the beginning of 1917 of the Pangerman plan of 1911.
II. Economic Pangermany.
III. Military Pangermany.

I.

The Pangerman plan of 1911 (see map p. 12) comprehended:

1. The formation of a great German Confederation which was to put under the absolute supremacy of the present German Empire, with its 540,858 square kilometres and 68 million inhabitants, foreign territories situated around Germany, which have an area of 1,182,113 square kilometres, and contain 94 million inhabitants.

Early in 1917 the German seizures already effected in these territories amounted in the West to 90,478 square kilometres, in the East to 260,000, and in the South (Austria-Hungary) to 676,616, making a total of 1,027,094 square

kilometres. Germany has therefore, so far as concerns the territories to be absorbed into the Germanic Confederation, achieved her programme in the proportion of 86%, or about nine-tenths.

2. The absolute subordination to Germany of all the Balkan States, with a superficies of 499,275 square kilometres, holding 22 millions of inhabitants. Here, in the beginning of 1917, the German seizure extended over about 285,585 square kilometers. The German programme concerning the Balkans had, therefore, been realized in the proportion of 57%.

3. The German seizures, more or less disguised, in the Ottoman Empire, extended over 1,792,900 square kilometres, holding 20 million inhabitants. Early in 1917 (not counting the portions of Persia occupied by the Turco-Germans, of which the area about balances the Anglo-Russian occupations in Armenia and Mesopotamia) we may say that the whole of Turkey is under German influence exclusively, and therefore the German plan has been realized in the proportion of 100%.

Let us now group together the figures which allow us to ascertain how nearly the general

PANGERMANY AT THE BEGINNING OF 1917
Area
Forecasts of the Pangerman Plan of 1911, Germany included
4,015,000 Sq.Kil.
Pangermany at present, that is about 9/10
3,600,000 Sq.Kil.
Essential strategic positions.
Population (Figures of 1914)
Three Groups
1. The Masters
2. The Vassals
3. The Slaves
Germans 10,000,000
Magyars 8,000,000
Bulgarians 6,000,000
Turks
79 Millions
French 3,000,000
Belgians 7,800,000
People of Alsace-Lorraine 1,500,000
Finns 200,000
Danes
Poles—Lithuanians 22,000,000
Ruthenians 5,600,000
Czechs 6,500,000
Yugo-Slavs 8,000,000
Roumanians 800,000
Italians 2,000,000
Armenians 2,000,000
Levantines 2,000,000
Ottoman Greeks 8,000,000
Arabs
21 Millions
82 Millions
Total, 178 Millions
PERSIA
Persian Gulf
Bagdad
Alexandretta
TURKEY
BLACK SEA
Constantinople
AEGEAN SEA
GREECE
ALBANIA
SERBIA
BULGARIA
ROUMANIA
HUNGARY
AUSTRIA
Vienna
Budapest
Prague
Pola
ADRIATIC S.
ITALY
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
FRANCE
Paris
Verdun
Belfort
Calais
BELGIUM
NETHER LANDS
Hamburg
Berlin
GERMANY
Riga
Petrograd
RUSSIA
London
Cuxhaven
NORTH SEA
ENGLAND
DENMARK
SWEDEN
NORWAY
BALTIC SEA

plan of continental Pangermany, made in 1911, has been carried out in 1917.

	Forecast in 1911. Square kilometres	Realization in the beginning of 1917. Square kilometres
I. Territories to be included in the great German Confederation	1,182,113	1,027,094
II. Balkans	499,275	285,585
III. Turkey	1,792,900	1,792,900
Total	3,474,288	3,105,579

These figures are startling evidence that early in 1917 *Germany had realized her Pangerman plan of* 1911 *in the enormous proportion of* 89%, *or almost nine-tenths.* If to each of these totals we add the superficies of the German Empire, 540,858 square kilometres, we find the area of Pangermany, in round numbers, at the beginning of 1917, to be 3,600,000 square kilometres, a figure which comes very close to the 4,015,000 square kilometres which represent Pangermany in the plan of 1911.

This figure is graphically confirmed by the map on p. 43.

We can see at a glance the geographical as well as superficial relations which exist between

the boundaries of the plan of 1911 and the fronts occupied early in 1917 by armies under the exclusive direction of Berlin.

* * *

A new extension of Pangerman invasion took place in the second half of 1917, following the capture of Riga and the advance of the German armies in Russia. The figures given above are, therefore, considerably below the truth; the fact which they demonstrate is therefore still more convincing.

Our conclusion from the foregoing statements must be that *Germany exists no longer; there is only Pangermany.* That is an essential fact, of which the importance is not yet fully realized, and as a result the Allies still continue to speak of Germany, Austria-Hungary, or Turkey as if these States had remained in the same conditions in which they were before the war. But that is by no means the case. The Quadruple Alliance of Central Europe is a great illusion, carefully fostered by the astute government at Berlin, because it is of the greatest service to their game. In reality Turkey, Bulgaria, and Austria-Hungary are not allies, but vassals of Berlin, and have less influence there than Saxony or Bavaria.

As may be seen by a glance at the map on p. 43, the effective forces of these three States are closely subordinated to the Prussian militarism which has helped Germany to reduce to practical slavery 82 millions of Latins, Slavs and Semites, belonging to thirteen different nationalities. The governments of Constantinople, of Sofia, of Vienna, and of Budapest have a thousand reasons in common for complying with the orders of Berlin, from which this enormous whole is administered.

Therefore, in order to reason clearly henceforth, we must not see only Germany, but Pangermany; unless we do this, disastrous errors of judgment will be made by the Allies. It is only by examining, not Germany but the actual Pangermany, that is to say, a gigantic territory counting already at the present time about 176 million souls, that we can justly appreciate the resources of every kind, military and economical, which the government of Berlin has at its disposal; more particularly should we endeavor to form a clear idea of economic and also of military Pangermany, as one completes the other.

II.

Economic Pangermany, as it was formerly outlined by Teutonic economists such as List, Roscher, Rodbertus, etc., may be thus defined: *A territory grouping together (solely under the supreme guidance of Berlin) Central Europe, the Balkans, and Turkey, this territory being vast enough to contain military and economic resources entirely sufficient for the needs of its population during war, and to insure its directors, in time of peace, domination over the world.*

As soon as the Hamburg-Bagdad railway was practically finished, the parcelling out of economic Pangermany was hastily carried on by Berlin under many widely different forms.

Control of customs: As realization of the great Pangerman *Zollverein*, or Customs Union, was not possible all at once, the Kaiser's government set about preparing the necessary steps. Numerous congresses were held in Berlin, attended by parliamentarians and men of business, German, Austrian, and Hungarian, who agreed on these three essential conclusions: 1. An economic customs agreement, of long duration, in which Germany and Austria-Hungary should constitute an economic unit; 2. In order to attain this by degrees, each side

should add to the number of articles already free from customs duties, and should establish a unified tariff for certain sorts of merchandise; 3. That Austro-Germany, Bulgaria, and Turkey should be brought into close economic union as rapidly as possible.

Ethnographic control: Certain populations considerably hinder the consolidation of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan; the Serbian nation, whose spirit cannot be subdued, are an obstacle to the establishment of the *Pangerman bridge or nexus* between Hungary and Bulgaria, without which bridge all the Pangerman plan could not be realized. The systematic destruction of the Serbian nation was confided to the Bulgarians, who, under pretext of putting down insurrections, slew not only Serbian men of fighting age, but old people of both sexes, women, and children in arms. In the Ottoman Empire, the Armenians occupied the regions which were indicated by Herr Delbrück in the Reichstag long ago as destined to constitute Germanic India. Berlin utilized the hereditary Turkish liking for the massacre of Christians, and already more than a million Armenians have been wiped off the face of the earth.

Agricultural control: The food crisis from

which Germany suffers has determined Berlin to make all haste to profit by the rich agricultural regions which the war has brought under her power. She has, therefore, sent hundreds of agronomic engineers, with thousands of agricultural machines, to Roumania, to Serbia, and to Asia Minor. In this latter country two centres of cultivation have received especial attention; in the province of Adana the production of cotton is being developed; on the Anatolian plains the intensive cultivation of cereals is pushed as fast as possible. These energetic efforts will have this twofold result: the Turks will not rise against the German domination, or at least not because of scarcity of food, and by means of the ever-increasing yield of Serbian, Roumanian, and Turkish soil, now scientifically treated, the food supply of the Central Powers will be more and more completely assured.

Banking control: As the exploitation of Oriental Pangermany requires an immense amount of capital, the German, Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Turkish banks have formed a group of powerful combinations. The leaders in Germany are the Deutsche Bank, the Dresdner Bank, and the Kölnische Bankverein; in Austria-Hungary, the Kredit

Anstalt in Vienna, and the Hungarian Bank of Credit in Budapest.

Economic control: As the rapid development of the latent resources of the Balkans and Turkey is the chief economic objective of the Germans, they have recently established, in co-operation with King Ferdinand, an *Institute for Improving Economic Relations between Germany and Bulgaria*, and in order to facilitate German penetration in Turkey, ten thousand Turkish boys, from twelve to eighteen years of age are to come to Germany for their technical education. They will live in German families, learn the German language, and be saturated with German ideas, with the result that they will become useful underlings and efficient fellow workers with the real Germans toward the Germanization of Turkey, and also for exploiting the concessions of every sort which the subjects of the Kaiser will exact from the Ottoman Government on account of the war.

Railway control: The railway system throughout European Pangermany has been improved and perfected by every possible means; in Turkey all the roads are under the absolute control of German officers. Of the 2,435 kilometres which separate Haidar Pacha (Constantinople) from Bagdad only 583 kilometres

are still to be built, and this distance is already crossed by automobile roads.

Canal control: The canal project which was outlined by the Pangermanist, Doctor G. Zoepfl, at a congress held in Berlin as far back as April 26th, 1895, was taken up and followed by the Economic Congress of Central Europe which met at Berlin on the 19th of March, 1917.

This plan is made up of the following elements: 1. Union of the Rhine and Danube by the adaptation of the Main to canal navigation and by the canal from the Main to the Danube; 2. Completion of the central canal between the Vistula and Rhine; 3. Canal from the Oder to the Danube, uniting the Baltic and the Black Sea; 4. Adaptation of the Rhine as far as Basle; 5. Union of the Weser and Main by means of the Fulda-Werra Rivers; 6. Union of the Elbe and Danube by the Moldau; 7. Union by means of canals of the Oder to the Danube and Vistula; 8. Union of the Danube and the Dniester by the Vistula; 9. Canalization of the Save; 10. Canalization of the Morava and the Vardar as far as Salonika.

The Danube, being the most powerful fluvial artery of central Pangermany, is the basis of this gigantic scheme.

"The Danube means everything to us," declared General von Groener in December, 1916.

This rapid sketch of the preparations now going on in economic Pangermany will enable any clear-sighted mind to understand the crushing power which this formidable organism will possess when all these mighty resources have been developed by the Germans for the benefit of their supremacy.

The organization of Pangermany is only beginning, and yet the economic forces which she is able to put at the service of Berlin are such as to permit Germany to keep up the war against enemies who, although much greater in number, are scattered.

The German dogged power of work, spirit of enterprise, and skill in organization need no further demonstration. We must, therefore, not doubt for a moment that they would draw, to their enormous advantage, all possible profits from Austria-Hungary, where there are vast regions still to be turned to account. The same would apply to the Balkan countries, many of which are still entirely untouched, and which contain a considerable amount of unexplored sources of wealth, both agricultural and mineral. This would also be true of Asiatic Turkey.

What intolerable authority would be wielded by an economic Pangermany, comprising nearly three millions of square kilometres, when once it was completely organized! It is obviously indisputable that the methodical turning to account, upon a great scale, of all the economic products of Pangermany, whether minerals or crops, live stock or manufactures, transported by cheap methods (such as a complete network of canals) would allow the Germans, even if they paid high wages to their own workmen, to reduce the cost price so considerably in all fields of production that the world would be forced to accept the products of Germany because of their cheapness. Our own good sense should convince us that any economic renascence of the European countries now allied would be impossible in face of the overwhelming methods of economic Pangermany. The economic ruin of the present Allies, following so onerous and exhausting a war as this one, would from the nature of things force them into political subjection to Berlin. Besides, not a single country in all the world could hold out against the pressure of economic Pangermany on the one hand, and on the other of the financial crises which would follow the irremediable ruin of the Allies. The fact

that economic Pangermany is now being organized is an ominous event on which the attention of all free peoples throughout the world should be concentrated, for it puts into the hands of Germany all the elements of an economic power which has no precedent in history.

III.

From this time forward Germany relies, above all else, on her military resources in order to establish indestructibly in the future the economic Pangermany which will be for her, in time of peace, an instrument for the permanent acquisition of wealth, and through this of world-wide domination. Military Pangermany is, therefore, at once the complement and the guarantee of economic Pangermany. The seizure by Berlin, under cover of the war, of new sources of man-power (Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Turkish contingents), and of bases or regions of exceptional strategic importance, either in the invaded districts or in the countries of her allies, has given Germany the foundations of military Pangermany. In 1914 the rigor of Prussian militarism was only felt by the 68 million inhabitants of the German Empire; at the beginning

of 1917 it was exercised, whether they wanted it or not, over about 176 million belonging to Pangermany (see maps pp. 12, 43). This result, the evident consequence of an immense extension of exclusive influence throughout Central and Oriental Europe, has allowed the General Staff of Berlin to organize as it chose strategic bases and regions where, *before the war*, it could exercise no direct action. For instance, Zeebrugge, on the North Sea, Trieste, Pola, and Cattaro on the Adriatic, the Bulgarian coast of the Ægean, the Ottoman straits, and the Turkish, Bulgarian, and Roumanian shores of the Black Sea have always been bases or regions of exceptional strategic value. This value is infinitely enhanced by the fact that these are now comprised in the military system which is subject only to the directing and organizing force of the General Staff at Berlin.

At the present time the Pangerman frontier is on these essential strategic bases, which are connected, one with another, to form a series of continuous fronts, fortified more strongly than has ever been known before by an intensive system of barbed-wire entanglements, deep-dug underground shelters, machine-guns, and heavy artillery.

The internal military organization of Pangermany is being swiftly and steadily pursued. Munition factories are judiciously distributed throughout the country, in order to utilize raw materials near where they are produced, and also to minimize the cost of transportation, and render it easy to send abundant ammunition quickly to any front which may be menaced. Thus, at the beginning of the war, Krupp established a number of very important branch munition factories, not only in Bavaria but also in Bulgaria and Turkey.

The system of strategic railways and automobile roads in Pangermany is being everywhere developed with great speed, especially in the Balkans and in Turkey, where it was relatively rudimentary. Behind every military front railways parallel to that front have been multiplied, to the end that reinforcements may be sent with the greatest possible haste to any sector threatened. All this has already made Pangermany into a gigantic and exceedingly strong fortress.

A new phase is also in course of preparation. The Kaiser's General Staff, no longer content with holding high command over the various armies of Pangermany, also desires, as far as is possible, to standardize their weapons, their

munitions, and their methods of instruction. Frederick Naumann, a deputy who is one of the protagonists of "*Mitteleuropa*," is obviously preparing the way toward this end, which, for geographical reasons, must first touch Austria-Hungary. In the *Vossische Zeitung* Naumann has advocated a "full and complete community between the Central Empires in matters concerning military organization." He adds firmly—*and it is an avowal worth remembering*—"*Mitteleuropa clearly exists to-day;* she only lacks the organs of movement and action. These organs can be given her by our two Emperors, since they dispose of the elements which are fundamental for the creation of a common army."* It is evident that if this hypothesis of the standardization of the armies of the two Central Empires is some day realized, neither Turkey nor Bulgaria, whose whole military resources seem likely to be used to their fullest extent by the German General Staff, could prevent the absorption of their military organization into the bosom of Pangermany.

It is easy to calculate the strength which the latter would be able to control. Even if Germany should evacuate Russia, Poland, Bel-

* *Le Temps* of June 28th, 1917.

gium, and France she would still include about 150 millions of inhabitants. As she has mobilized about 20% of her own population and of those of her allies who have become her vassals, it is easy to see that central Pangermany can count upon approximately 30 millions of soldiers.

Prussian militarism, whose annihilation by the Allies is the true, the legitimate, and essential aim of the war, has therefore become, by the carrying out of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan, more wide-spread and more active than it was in 1914. The events which have already occurred, and those which are foreshadowed, show, in addition, that Berlin, while pursuing with systematic ardor a peace campaign intended to dupe and to separate the Allies, is taking every measure possible to make Pangermany into a fortress of a strength hitherto unknown.

CHAPTER V.

PACIFIST MANŒUVRES TO KEEP THE HAMBURG-PERSIAN GULF SCHEME FOR GERMANY AS A MINIMUM RESULT OF THE WAR.

I. Strategic and economic conceptions of the German General Staff upon which all pacifist manœuvres are based.
II. Separate peace to be made by Berlin with one of the Entente. The trick of Alsace-Lorraine.
III. Separate peace to be made with the Entente by Turkey, Bulgaria, or Austria-Hungary.
IV. The democratization of Germany.
V. Peace by the "Internationale" or Socialist party.
VI. The trick of an armistice.
VII. The Drawn Game, or "Peace without annexations or indemnities."
VIII. What is Germany's word worth?

The mathematical and geographical evidence given in the preceding chapter, which establishes the fact that Pangermany is already nine-tenths made (see map p. 43) enables us to see clearly why Germany has been anxious, since the end of 1915, to conclude peace. Berlin wants it simply because, as the *Frankfurter Zeitung* said with the utmost frankness at that time, the objects of the war had been attained. In December, 1916, one

of her allies, Count Karolyi, speaking in the Hungarian Chamber of Deputies, declared that "Germany is fighting for Berlin-Bagdad."* Now the Berlin-Bagdad plan has been substantially realized since the end of 1915, and the prolongation of the war (by giving all the nations of the world who were threatened by it time to understand the huge danger of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf, a formula more exact than Berlin-Bagdad to explain the framework of the whole Pangerman plan) could only compromise and finally do away with the enormous results already achieved by Germany. *The Berlin Government therefore wants peace—but it wants a Pangerman peace, which will leave Germany the greatest advantage possible, whether through the seizures which she has made at the expense of her own allies, or through those which she has realized at the expense of the Entente.* As Major Moraht said bluntly in the *Berliner Tageblatt:* "Our military leaders are not in the habit of giving up what it has cost us blood and sacrifice to gain."†

But, as a coalition of three-fourths of the world was being organized, it was thought at Berlin that it would be skilful to appear to

* *Le Journal de Genève,* December 30th, 1916.
† *Le Matin,* December 27th, 1915.

yield just enough to break up this world-wide alliance. Germany therefore resolved to give up—*if it was absolutely necessary, and moreover only for the moment*—a fraction of the territories which she had invaded in the east and those which she occupied in the west, in order to make sure, by indirect means (which, however, should still have practical results) of those Pangerman seizures and advantages which were to her of vital importance. With this end in view Berlin has thought out the most subtle and ingenious manœuvres, and is carrying them on with untiring persistence, thanks to her marvellous equipment for propaganda.

Her one and only aim is to divide and dupe the Allies, that in the end she may at least keep Central Pangermany—that is to say *the Hamburg-Persian Gulf—which is the result of the hegemony established by Germany over Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, because of the destruction of Serbia.* For reasons which will be given in Chapter VI, Central Pangermany would provide Germany with all the means to carry out in full, and within a short time, her programme of universal domination.

I.

In order to grasp clearly the true meaning of the German pacifist manœuvres (which are all only intended to secure possession of a maximum amount of invaded territory and hold seizures already made), we must have a clear idea of the strategic and economic plans of the General Staff at Berlin, upon which these manœuvres are based.

The Germans are intrenching themselves more and more strongly on all the fronts of Pangermany, which they have made into a gigantic fortress (see map on p. 63), by accumulating everywhere concrete trenches, deep-dug underground shelters, fields of barbed wire, machine-guns and heavy artillery, and by mobilizing, as in Germany, about 20% of the population of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Thanks to this organization, which is particularly strong in the west, the Germans hope to be able to continue resistance to the Allies until the enemy grows weary of the frightful struggle. The experience of the war having proved how extremely difficult it is to pierce strongly fortified lines, the German General Staff appears to have taken this knowledge as the base of the following calculation:

"We have achieved nine-tenths of the annexations on which we counted; only Calais, Verdun, Belfort, Riga, and Salonika are want-

ing. We will try to obtain possession of these places if opportunity offers, if not, in order to avoid excessive risks, we shall remain everywhere in Europe on a keen defensive, pretending all the time that we wish to attack, in order to mislead our adversaries. If the Allies insist on concentrating their efforts above all against our lines of the eastern front, as these lines are manifold and constantly strengthened the enemy losses will be such that, even if they succeed in making us fall back by successive stages, their own forces will finally be so utterly exhausted that they will not be able to cross the Rhine. For that reason, therefore, they will be powerless to dictate peace to Germany, who will therefore remain mistress of Central Pangermany under such conditions that the Pangerman conquests in the west may be definitely realized once for all after a short respite."

This strategic conception, which seems to be that of Hindenburg, is further based on the following economic considerations: The enormous fortress into which Pangermany has been made comprises such a vast territory that it contains, although undeveloped, all the foodstuffs essential to Germany and her allies. The only problem consists in creating an effec-

tive organization quickly enough to draw out these latent resources in time to have them ready when they are needed. It is certain that the measures recently taken by the United States will make the blockade of the Central Powers by sea very stringent. The neutral States can only supply them to a limited extent. Until hostilities are over Germany must go without certain products which need years for their cultivation, but as she has laid hands on more than half Roumania, and has taken possession of exceedingly fertile, although uncultivated, lands in the Balkans, and also in Asia Minor, it will be possible for her to prevent the food difficulty from reaching an acute stage.

That is why, for the last two years, those great tracts of country, whether already under cultivation or still virgin, have been brought gradually under intensive culture. The increasing production of cereals in that rich Oriental soil will solve the food problem.

Germany and her vassals will, no doubt, be more or less pinched from an alimentary point of view, but, contrary to the belief held in many of the allied countries, they cannot be actually starved. Besides, the effects of the German submarine warfare, combined with the

anarchy which has been let loose in Russia through German propaganda, will considerably diminish the food supplies of Germany's adversaries. Under these circumstances, and above all, thanks to the resources of Pangermany, Germany may hold out at least as long as the Allies.

* * *

It would seem that those must be substantially the strategic and economic conceptions upon which the German Staff grounds its faith that the war can be carried on as long as is necessary. But as prolongation of the struggle carries with it the chances of various serious contingencies, Berlin would like to make an end of it under conditions allowing her to reserve a maximum amount of her seizures. That is the object of the German pacifist manœuvres, some of the chief of which are exposed above.

II.

It is clear that the defection of one of the principal Allies would necessarily place the others in vastly more difficult positions for continuing the struggle. Assuming that such a thing were to happen, the Germans could,

indeed, hope to discuss peace on the base of the territories which they actually occupy. It is for that reason that they have made repeated proposals for a separate peace to the Russians, as Berlin especially dreads their continuance in the war, on account of the inexhaustible reserves of man-power still contained in the old Empire of the Czars. The moment will probably come when the Germans will also attempt to draw Italy out of the coalition by offering her Trent and perhaps even Trieste, at the expense of Austria; the latter concession, however, in the mind of Berlin, would be only for a very brief period.

The Germans desire so strongly to break up the coalition at any price that we must be prepared to see them go so far, when the time comes, as to offer Alsace-Lorraine to France.

We may judge how sincere such a proposition would be by the words written by Maximilian Harden early in 1915: "If France believes that peace is only possible through the restitution of Alsace-Lorraine, and *if necessity obliges us to sign such an agreement, the seventy millions of our German people would soon tear it up.*" * Nothing indeed would be easier than for Germany, helped by the man-power

* *Le Temps*, February 9th, 1916.

of Central Pangermany, speedily to retake Alsace-Lorraine, even if she ceded it for a short time as a tactical measure.

The allied State which, contrary to its solemn agreement, should separately treat with Berlin would be punished for its infamy without delay. By allowing Germany to conclude peace more or less on the basis of the territories she holds at present, it would find itself at once confronted by a formidable Germanic Empire, and would inevitably soon become one of its future victims.

III.

One of the most astute manœuvres of Berlin consists in secretly favoring—not perhaps a treaty of peace formally signed—but official negotiations for a separate peace between one of her allies, Turkey, Bulgaria, or Austria-Hungary—and the Entente.

The advantage to be gained from this artifice will be readily seen from its bearing on the definite consolidation of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf, if one imagines the Allies concluding a *peace by negotiation*, from weariness, with Turkey, for instance. On this hypothesis, the Allies could only treat with Germany's liegemen at Constantinople, for all the other

elements having any value whatever in Turkish politics are already suppressed. Now, if the Allies were to deal with the Ottoman Government, dripping with the blood of a million Armenians, Greeks, and Arabs massacred wholesale because they were anti-Germanic and friends of the Entente, the result of the negotiation would be as follows: The Entente, by condoning the unheard-of crimes committed in Turkey would abandon her moral standards; she could never again pretend that she was fighting in the cause of civilization. The Turkish Government, which is notoriously made up of assassins, would be officially recognized, and the group of men who sold the Ottoman Empire to Germany would be confirmed in power. Their leader, Talaat Pacha, declared in the Ottoman Chamber in February, 1917: "We are bound to the Central Powers for life or death." * The seizure of the Ottoman straits by Germany, a strategic position of immense and universal value, to be held by her accomplices, would be confirmed; the many agreements signed in Berlin in January, 1917, establishing a stringent German protectorate over all Turkey, would be in full force during a Pangerman peace.

* *Le Matin*, February 17th, 1917.

Bulgarian intrigues for a pretended separate peace with the Allies have been at least as numerous as Turkish manœuvres of the same description. As a matter of fact, the Bulgarian agents who were sent to Switzerland, apparently for the purpose of opening tempting negotiations with the official representatives of the Entente, were working in concert with Berlin, and their real object was to sound the Allies in order to find out to what extent they were weary of the war. The Bulgarians have never been really disposed to make a treaty of peace with the Allies on any equitable terms; they want a peace which will insure them enormous advantages at the expense of the Greeks, the Roumanians, and above all the Serbians, for Sofia's chief desire is to be in direct geographic contact with Austria-Hungary. Therefore the Allies cannot have dealings with Bulgaria without committing themselves to the infamy of sacrificing their smaller Balkan allies and accepting territorial conditions which would allow Bulgaria to form a Pangerman bridge between Hungary and Turkey, over the corpse of Serbia. *This bridge is indispensable to the working of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan*, and therefore to Central Pangermany, and is precisely the result

of the war which Bulgaria wants most of all. The King of Bulgaria declared in the *Neues Tageblatt* of Stuttgart, in August, 1917: "The economic future of Bulgaria depends on her close connection with Germany and Austria." * Further, Doctor Friedrich Naumann, one of the most ardent advocates of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf, said in a pamphlet which he published at Berlin in 1916, under the title of *Bulgaria and Mitteleuropa*, that he had found from investigations made in Bulgaria that the prospect of a close union with the Germanic Empires was hailed with real enthusiasm.

A peace made by negotiation between the Allies and Bulgaria, which would in reality be a peace made because of weariness, would only lend further sanction to these conditions.

It is also true that a peace by negotiation between the Allies and Austria-Hungary could only definitely consolidate the Hamburg-Persian Gulf. Both from a military and from a financial standpoint the monarchy of the Hapsburgs is, as a State, absolutely dependent on Germany. The Hapsburg Emperor, no matter what his own feelings may be, can do nothing without Hohenzollern consent. Any peace signed by Vienna would have its condi-

* *Le Matin*, August 14th, 1917.

tions practically arranged by Berlin. It is well to have no illusions. *Only a complete victory by the Allies will force Germany to give up her seizure of Austria-Hungary, for that seizure is to her the indispensable result of the war.*

It is that seizure which, because of its geographic, military, and economic value insures to Berlin domination over the Balkans and the Orient, and therefore over Central Pangermany and the Hamburg-Persian Gulf strip, with all the momentous consequences which their possession entails.

Let us be firmly assured that all attempts at a separate peace on the part of Turkey, Bulgaria, or Austria-Hungary which have taken place already or which may take place in the future are only, and can only be, manœuvres having in view a *peace said to be by negotiation*, which would be merely a cloak for a peace not only German but Pangerman.

Furthermore, the Allies should clearly understand that if they really wish to destroy Prussian militarism, so that it cannot again exist, they must at the same time put an end to the neo-imperialism of the Turks and Panislamists, Balkan imperialism in Bulgaria, Austrian imperialism at Salonika, and the feudal imperialism of the Magyars—*that is to say, four*

secondary imperialisms, dangerous in a high degree, as they are the complements of German imperialism, and would, if allowed to exist, permit a revival of Prussian militarism.

Now, these four secondary imperialisms cannot possibly be *destroyed by a peace by negotiation, which would only be the outcome of war-weariness; they must perish through a military victory on the part of the Allies—that is to say, by intelligent strength serving the cause of justice.*

IV.

As some of the allied groups appeared to believe that the "democratization" of Germany would suffice to end Prussianism and German imperialism automatically, Berlin came to the conclusion that at least a certain part of them, tired of fighting, would content themselves with merely nominal amends, in order to end the war. That is the reason why Berlin, in order to throw dust in the eyes of the Allies, and make them willing to enter into negotiations, lent herself increasingly, during the first six months of 1917, to the comedy of "the democratization of Germany." During this period the most avowed Pangermans bridled their utterances. They spoke no more

of annexations nor of war indemnities. They only talked of "special political organizations," which in their own minds meant the same result, but which had the advantage of not hindering the action of those pacifists in the allied countries who wanted peace at any price. The manœuvre of the "democratization of Germany" was supplemented by that of the Stockholm congress, which, as we know, was above all meant to convince Russian Socialists that Russia had nothing to gain by going on with the war, since Germany in her turn was firmly resolved to tread the path of democracy, etc.

We must acknowledge that many of the Allies were, for a time, taken in by this game, and honestly believed that Germany meant seriously to undertake internal reforms. But when these tactics had had the tremendous result of letting anarchy loose in Russia (a state of things which was at once taken advantage of by the General Staff of Berlin), the comedy of "the democratization of Germany" was withdrawn. The Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, was sacrificed because it was necessary to stop a movement which he had been directing, and was replaced by Michaelis, Hindenburg's man, who therefore stood for the

Prussian military party and ultra-Pangermanism.

As this manœuvre of the "democratization of Germany" is sure to be tried many times, it is in the highest degree important that the Allies should not again be duped by it. They can never sufficiently safeguard themselves against bad faith on Germany's part. Should a German republic be established, the result would, no doubt, be serious, but *even then the most positive and most effective measures should be taken by the Allies themselves, if they really wish to put an end to huge armaments and prevent any recrudescence of German militarism.*

Good sense would seem to indicate the destruction of all German munition factories as among the most important of these measures on the part of the Allies; destruction which would only be complete if the Allies did it themselves or had it done under their direct supervision. Without that indispensable precaution—to say nothing of many others—the sacrifices of the Allies during the war would have been made in vain.

Indeed, the Germans have always had such an inveterate taste for rapine that they are perfectly capable of forming a great military republic and submitting themselves volun-

tarily to Prussian discipline in order to be able to start new and great wars for the sake of plunder.

This truth should be ever in our minds. If, in Mirabeau's words, the Hohenzollerns have been able to make war "the national industry" of the Germans, it is because, since the beginning of history, the Germans have always subordinated everything else to their passion for lucrative fighting. And such is still the case. For the last twenty years especially the Berlin Government has instilled into the people that the creation of Pangermany would insure them great material advantages. It is because that conviction is firmly rooted in their minds that almost all the Socialist workmen serve the Kaiser without flinching, and are content to suffer all the horrors of the present war so long as they are not defeated by force of arms.

"During the war," said M. E. Laskine,* "the organs of the workmen's syndicates have given the most constant and solid support to the policy of aggression and conquest. The *Internationale Korrespondenz*, published in the name of the General Commission of Syndicates by Legien and Bauermeister, affirms that

* *Le Matin*, August 27th, 1917.

Germany has a right to 'solid guarantees,' whether furnished by annexations or by 'economic ties.' Emil Kloth, president of the syndicate of bookbinders, was applauded by the *Kreuzzeitung*, the organ of the Junker squires, for declaring himself as opposed to the independence of Belgium. On the 24th of October, 1914, we might have read in the *Kurier*, which is the mouthpiece of the powerful syndicate of transportation workers, this statement: 'The German flag now floats over the towers of Antwerp—*let us hope forever.*'"

Thus even the German Social Democrats use glibly expressions such as "solid guarantees" and "economic ties," which, in their practical application, insure the consolidation of Central Pangermany. It is impossible to doubt that the Pangerman spirit has penetrated into the very soul of the German working classes. As this state of feeling has been in accord with German psychology for hundreds of years, we should be singularly credulous to imagine that a few measures of "democratization," more formal than actual, could change the mental attitude of the German people. To obtain this result other and more appropriate measures must be taken.

V.

Peace through the Internationale is yet another device invented at Berlin. In fact, as the *Internationale* has always followed the guidance of the German Marxists, it has been the chief means employed during the last thirty years to deceive the Socialists of the countries now allied, by making them believe that, thanks precisely to the *Internationale*, war could never come again. In a report upon "The International Relations of German Workmen's Unions," published in Berlin by Heymann in 1914, the Imperial Bureau of Statistics could announce, on p. 19, as an incontestable truth, that "In almost all international organizations German influence is predominant."*

The proposed congress at Stockholm, which was suggested by German agents, and that at Berne, for which they are working now, are measures set on foot by German syndicalism in order to regain in all countries the German influence which has been lost by the war. It is a question of subjecting the proletariat of the world to German guidance. The end officially avowed is to restore the *Internationale* in the interests of democracy, but as a matter of

* M. E. Laskine; *Le Matin*, August 27th, 1917.

fact it is above all to bring class antagonism again to the fore in all the allied countries, in order to destroy the sacred union which alone will allow parties of widely differing opinions to carry on the war against Pangerman Germany with vigor. The government of Berlin is well aware that it has nothing to fear from its Socialists, of whom the great majority, even when they refuse to call themselves Pangermans, are in favor of Central Pangermany. Any profit from this manœuvre, based on the *Internationale*, would accrue to Germany, who would keep her powers of moral resistance intact, while the allied States, again the prey of the most intense social disruptions, would find their powers of offensive so diminished that peace would finally be made on the basis of the actual German occupations of territory.

VI.

All the foregoing manœuvres, whether employed separately or in combination, are intended to play the "armistice trick" on the Allies. This is the result of crafty calculation, founded on the fatigue of the combatants, which is easily to be explained by such an exhausting war. Berlin follows this reasoning,

which has a certain psychological merit: "If an armistice were signed, the allied soldiers would think: 'They are talking, therefore it means peace, and demobilization will soon follow.' Under these conditions the effect will be the moral slackening of our adversaries." The Germans could not ask for anything better. They would open peace negotiations with the following astute idea: Assuming that the Allies committed the enormous mistake of discussing peace on such treacherous terms, Germany, still intrenched behind her fronts, which would have been rendered almost impregnable, would end by saying to the Allies: "I don't agree with you. After all you cannot exact of me that I should evacuate territories from which you are powerless to drive me. If you are not satisfied, continue the war." As, while negotiations were pending, all needful steps would have been taken by German agents to aggravate the moral slackening of the soldiers of the allied country which had felt the strain of the war most (as they succeeded in doing in Russia, during the first days of the revolution), the huge military machine of the Allies could not again be put in motion as a whole. The real result would be, in fact, the rupture of the anti-Germanic coalition, and finally the

conclusion of a peace based nearly on actual occupation. Berlin would thus have gained her end.

VII.

The last German manœuvre, and the most dangerous of all, is one which I foresaw in the beginning of 1916 as likely to be attempted as soon as Germany found it necessary to make peace quickly, in order, above all, to save the Hamburg-Persian Gulf. I said then: "Petitions against territorial annexations will be multiplied on the other side of the Rhine. In an underhand way they will be favored by the government of Berlin, which will end by saying to the Allies: 'Let us stop killing each other. I am perfectly reasonable. I give up my claims on such of your territories as are occupied by my armies. Let us negotiate peace on the basis of the "drawn game."'"

This was exactly what happened when about April, 1917, the snare of the "drawn game" was hidden under the formula of "peace without annexations or indemnities," which the government of Berlin suggested to the Russian Socialists through the innumerable agents which she maintains in the former Empire of the Czars. This formula has since then

been the basis of so much discussion that it is of the highest importance to show in a separate chapter what in reality lurks behind those words, "peace without annexations or indemnities." It is certain that if the trick of "the apparently drawn game" should succeed it would, in reality, conceal a formidable success for Germany and an irremediable catastrophe for the Allies and for the freedom of the world.

VIII.

Repeated lessons from German history, and those which have been learned in the present war, make it imperative that the Allies should not put the slightest confidence in the Germans. The treaties which they sign in the most solemn manner are only "scraps of paper," the obligations of which they only respect in the measure of their own interest. This is overwhelmingly proved by Berlin's cynical violation of the treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium, which was signed in London by Prussia on June 26th, 1831. It is a fact that the Germans, almost to a man, only respect might; and this they proclaim themselves. Referring to the submarine warfare on the coast of Norway, the *Frankfurter Zeitung*

did not hesitate to say: "Justice no longer exists. Only strength counts, and we have still strength to spare. Norway has felt it." *

The Kaiser himself, in the course of a conversation about submarine warfare with Mr. Gerard, the American ambassador at Berlin, said to him: "There are no more international laws." † A Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin announced to Mr. Gerard that: "We care nothing for treaties." ‡ On July 10th, 1917, the Reichstag passed a vote for a so-called amicable peace, without annexations, which the Chancellor then seemed to approve. But when the results of this manœuvre, combined with the measure called the "democratization of Germany," were shown by the letting loose of Russian anarchy, and the adhesion to the principles of the Stockholm congress by some groups of French and English Socialists who were particularly credulous, and ignorant of the formidable realities of the war map, the Chancellor, Michaelis, declared on August 22d, before a committee of the Reichstag: "I never said that I agreed with the peace resolution which was proposed by the parties

* *Le Temps*, November 19th, 1916.
† *Le Matin*, August 16th, 1917.
‡ *Le Temps*, August 10th, 1917.

forming a majority in the Reichstag and adopted by that assembly on the 19th of last July. In any case, I wish to state that I did not accept any terms of peace, *as I must naturally reserve my freedom of action for peace negotiations.*" * As the cynicism of this speech was considered likely to hinder further peace manœuvres, the Chancellor pretended later that he had only made a slip of the tongue, and that he upheld the peace formula voted by the Reichstag on July 19th. After words as plain as those used by him on August 22d, this excuse of a *lapsus linguæ* can only cheat those who wish to be cheated.

This incident, coming after so many others, and after such a number of unquestioned facts, does not leave the least room for hesitation. *The Allies should be convinced that no faith can be placed in the German word.* All the pacifist manœuvres of Berlin have but one object—to separate and dupe the Allies by means of negotiations which will be followed by a refusal to accept the terms apparently agreed upon, and Germany will hold her positions on the war map, and at least Central Pangermany. In the end of 1916 the *Frankfurter Zeitung* warned its readers very plainly of the exact

* *Le Journal*, August 24th, 1917.

spirit in which all German pacifist manœuvres should be undertaken: "This is the point of view to-day: to formulate our demands precisely in the East, and in the West to negotiate on a basis which may be modified. *Negotiation is not synonymous with renunciation.*"*

To sum up: Unless they are willing to be frightfully and unpardonably duped, the Allies will not allow themselves to be taken in by any German manœuvres framed to induce them to negotiate before they have gained a military victory, of which the first proof having any real value will be the retirement of all German officers and soldiers from: 1. All the invaded territories of the Entente. 2. All the territories in Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey, and any parts of Central Pangermany now held under military occupation by the Germans as a result of the war.

**L'Echo de Paris*, December 30th, 1916.

CHAPTER VI.

THE "DRAWN GAME"; THE INSIDIOUS SNARE OF THE FORMULA, "PEACE WITHOUT ANNEXATIONS OR INDEMNITIES."

I. How the hypothesis is brought forward.
II. Cost of the war much greater to the Allies than to the Germans.
III. The struggle has allowed Germany to obtain enormous advantages in the present and for the future.
IV. The war has brought the Allies only losses.
V. Consequences of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan in regard to Russia and Asia.
VI. The blatant falsehood of the formula, "Peace without annexations or indemnities."
VII. The formidable danger of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan to the Allies.

I.

It is important first of all to have a clear idea how and under what circumstances the hypothesis of the "drawn game," or "peace without annexations or indemnities" has been presented. This formula was proposed to the Russians by the numerous agents whom the Germans had been able to smuggle into the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates of Petrograd at the beginning of the revolution. This amazing manœuvre met with suc-

cess because in this famous *Soviet* there were rank traitors, unmasked later, like Lenine and his accomplices, and also Socialists who were well-meaning but so densely ignorant, not only of the Pangerman plan, but even of what was important and necessary for Russia, that in a few weeks their ardent but unpractical plans had gravely aggravated the Russian situation, already serious enough under the Czar, and had plunged their country not only into anarchy, but also into extraordinary difficulties, political, financial, and economic. Whatever the reason, on March 28th, 1917, the *Soviet* proclaimed the formula, "peace without annexations or indemnities," with which it had been supplied from Berlin. On June 12th, 1917, the imperialistic German Socialists who had been delegated to Stockholm by the Kaiser's government also declared for the adoption of a programme of peace, with "neither annexations nor indemnities." On July 19th, 1917, at the intervention of Erzberger, one of its deputies, the Reichstag voted a peace resolution "rejecting the idea of acquiring territory by force," and declared that "the Reichstag seeks an amicable peace. . . . Any violent action, political, economic, or social, is incompatible with such a peace."

Now this formula, due to the intervention of the deputy Erzberger, rejecting any idea of "annexations or indemnities," was intended to be combined with the intervention of the Pope, which had been already arranged by this same Erzberger. Indeed, in the spring of 1917, therefore several months before the vote of the Reichstag on July 19th, Erzberger founded "the Catholic International Peace League" in Switzerland. This organization, which was made up of Germans, Austrians, and a few Swiss Catholics, was directed by Erzberger, and its object was to bring pressure to bear upon the Vatican. A deputation from this league went to Rome in June, 1917, to beseech the Pope to make proposals of peace. On August 1st, 1917, Pope Benedict XV (who had in the meantime been implored to intervene by the Emperor and Empress of Austria) advanced in his turn the formula of "peace without annexations or indemnities"; he was noticeably careful not to condemn the crimes of Germany, and said nothing about the many formidable Oriental problems. The *Messagero* of Rome explained this silence: "Benedict XV thinks that the door of the East should be left open, or at least ajar, for Austria-Hungary, and through her for Germany. Complete restitu-

tion of territory to Serbia and Roumania would mean that the highway of the Danube has been brought back into ante-bellum conditions, and that the road to the East is barred in the same way as before the war." * It is true that in his letter the Pope only made a clear pronouncement as to the restitutions to be made by Germany in the west and the east; he said absolutely nothing as to the territories necessary for maintaining Central Pangermany. That is an essential fact which it is necessary to notice and to remember. It must also be noted that some groups of French and English Socialists, as ignorant as their Russian brethren concerning the realities of the war map and the Pangerman plan, have also adopted the formula of "peace without annexations or indemnities," evidently not understanding its formidable consequences, political, economic, and military, which will be set forth later. It is certain that the effect of an intensive German propaganda has been to have this formula of "peace without annexations or indemnities" (which is part of the vast encircling manœuvre of Berlin) adopted both by the most anarchistic of the Russian maximalists, and by the most ultramontane

* *Le Temps*, August 18th, 1917.

followers of the Vatican. On the face of it, the German formula, which is summed up in the words "the drawn game," would seem to mean that each country should keep the same frontiers as before the war; also that each country should bear the burden of the outlays it had made during the struggle.

But in order to prove beyond doubt and most emphatically what is really concealed in this apparent German concession, we will argue on a hypothesis infinitely more favorable for the western Allies than that of the "drawn game." We will suppose (see map on p. 91) that Germany should declare herself finally disposed, not only to evacuate altogether Poland, the French departments, Belgium, and Luxemburg, *but also to restore Alsace-Lorraine to France, and even, let us still further suppose, to give as an indemnity all the rest of the left bank of the Rhine, under the sole and tacit condition that Germany should keep her preponderating influence, direct or indirect, over Austria-Hungary, the Balkans and Turkey.*

If matters are probed to the bottom it will be easily seen that, should the Allies negotiate peace with Germany on such a basis, the restitution of Alsace-Lorraine could only be temporary, for a peace like that would secure to

Germany all the elements of power which would allow her, after a very short respite, to retake Alsace-Lorraine, and in the end to over-

come all the Allies and to achieve in its entirety the Pangerman plan, not only in Europe but in Asia, and even throughout the world.

* * *

To give up the left bank of the Rhine, according to our hypothesis, would mean for Germany the loss of 47,450 square kilometres, and 10 million inhabitants. The present German Empire would therefore be reduced to 493,408 square kilometres and 58 million inhabitants. But this loss in the west would be far more than counterbalanced by the close union of Austria-Hungary to the German Empire, which would be none the less real because it would be disguised. On this reckoning Berlin's influence would be exercised directly and absolutely over the German Empire, curtailed in the west, with 493,408 square kilometres and 58 million inhabitants, and Austria-Hungary, with 676,616 square kilometres and 50 million inhabitants.

It is evident that a solid block of States, established in Central Europe under the direction of Berlin, would exercise, simply by contiguity, an absolutely preponderant pressure on 499,275 square kilometres in the Balkans, with a population of 22 millions, and in

Turkey on 1,792,000 square kilometres, with a population of 20 millions, making a total of 2,291,275 square kilometres, holding 42 million inhabitants.

Therefore Berlin's preponderating influence would be wielded, directly or indirectly, over 3,461,299 square kilometres, holding 172 millions of inhabitants. We now see clearly that in the end the trick of the "drawn game" would really lead to the consolidation of Central Pangermany, as summed up in the formula Hamburg-Persian Gulf, resulting in formidable consequences, financial, political, and economic. As these would be felt universally, it is important that we should fully realize them.

II.

Because it was planned long ago, and therefore slowly prepared for, the war has cost Germany infinitely less than it has her adversaries. There are six fundamental reasons which combine to give Berlin the advantage, and are consequently detrimental to the Allies.

1. Germany has not had to suffer from the effects of improvising war material, which is always ruinously expensive.

2. Workmen's wages in Germany, judging

from peace times, are lower than those paid in the allied countries.

3. Careful German preparedness enabled them to avoid enormous waste of raw materials in munition factories and in food supplies.

4. Two millions of prisoners and nearly 42 million inhabitants of the territories occupied by the Germans give them a prodigious amount of almost free labor on which to draw, and of this they avail themselves largely.

5. The iron, coal, and copper mines and the petroleum wells seized by the Germans in Poland, Serbia, Belgium, and France allow them to make munitions at a comparatively low net cost.

6. The geographical conditions of Pangermany are such that German transportation of every sort is infinitely cheaper than with the Allies.

These six factors affect the general expenses of the war to a very large degree. It is positive that Germany is running the war under conditions much less onerous than those of the Allies.

This is easily further proved by a couple of figures. During the three years of the war Germany, with 68 million inhabitants, has spent about 115 milliards, while France, with

only 40 million, has spent 100 milliards. In France the State has therefore spent at the rate of nearly 2,500 francs a head, while the German State has spent only about 1,690 francs a head. A comparison of the relative war expenses of the two groups of belligerents will make this demonstration yet more striking.

III.

Setting aside the inevitable losses which Germany, like any belligerent, has suffered because of the war, such as the stoppage of exportations with the consequent heavy fall in exchange, loss of ships, etc., we must bear clearly in mind that Germany alone, of all the combatants, has made profits which far exceed her losses.

This question of the advantages which Germany has secured from the war, both in the present and for the future, is (if conditions such as they are now should continue) of such paramount importance that it amounts to a special and separate subject. In this book I can only point out that these profits are mainly due to seven chief causes.

First source of war profits: The stupendous amount of plunder seized by the Germans in the

500,000 *square kilometres which they hold in Montenegro, in Albania, in Serbia, in Roumania, in Russia, in Belgium, and in France.*

This booty is made up of human beings and supplies of various kinds, such as free labor, military stores, foodstuffs, minerals, raw and manufactured materials, movable objects such as art treasures and jewels, forced contributions, specie, and securities, and has been systematically collected by the Germans for the past three years. It certainly represents a value of several tens of billions of francs. The value of the territories occupied by Germany, judging by estimates made before the war, may be reckoned at about 155 billions of francs.

Second source of war profits: Pangerman mortgages on her allies held by Berlin. Germany has turned the war to account by swindling her own allies; in order to enable them to carry on the war (always, moreover, to her advantage) she has made them loans which were not burdensome to her, since they were only *on paper*. Now, by the effect of these loans (which, considering the circumstances and the terms of their fulfilment, constitute a new form of "kolossal" knavery) Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, which represent

a total of 2,583,000 square kilometres, and which are countries, as the map on p. 43 shows, *indispensable to the carrying out of Central Pan-germany and the Hamburg-Persian Gulf*, are heavily mortgaged for the benefit of Germany. These mortgages are combined with economic or political agreements made during the war between the government at Berlin on the one hand, and those of Vienna, Budapest, Sofia, and Constantinople on the other. The treaties signed at Berlin on January 11th, 1917, may be especially instanced, as they practically put Turkey under a German protectorate. The result of these loans and agreements (to which should be added military direction by the General Staff of Berlin) has been to put Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, whose national riches were valued before the war at about 269 billion francs, absolutely under the hegemony of Prussia.

Third source of war profits: The value of the sole right to develop the latent resources of the Balkans and Turkey. The Balkans and the Ottoman Empire contain enormous riches, both mineral and agricultural, which are still undeveloped, and therefore not yet estimated. The treaties made during the war between Berlin, Sofia, and Constantinople practically

put this development almost wholly into German hands.

Fourth source of war profits: Value resulting from the creation of economic Pangermany. It is clear that if the economic Pangermany (see Chapter IV., II.), based on the Hamburg-Persian Gulf, which the Germans are beginning to organize, is to endure and fulfil its natural consequences, the trade and industry of every other country in the world will find it absolutely impossible to struggle against so formidable an organization. The fact that Germany has laid hands on the territory of economic Pangermany, which is intended to be a permanent source of wealth, may surely be considered a war profit. It is true that this profit cannot be estimated in exact figures, but their sum must certainly be gigantic.

Fifth source of war profits: The value of military Pangermany (see Chapter IV., III.), *as this is a guarantee of the duration of economic Pangermany.*

Sixth source of war profits: The value of the enormous economic profits which Pangermany will make for Germany at the expense of Russia.

It stands to reason that if Pangermany is to exist by cutting Europe in two, her economic and military pressure will be irresistible in the

east. Russia will finally break up into groups of anarchical republics, and Germany's influence will predominate in the development of the enormous immense natural wealth of European and Asiatic Russia.

Seventh source of war profits: The substitution of Germany for France, in 21 billion francs at least of French loans to Russia, Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, and Turkey, these loans passing as a matter of fact to Germany in consequence of the establishment of Central Pangermany. The variety of these war profits is so great and the mortgages which they impose upon the present and the future so far-reaching that it is impossible to calculate them exactly, but if we could do so the total sum would surely be extraordinary.

In three years of war Germany has only spent about 115 billions of francs. If in our minds we deduct this sum from that of her war profits one may well imagine that, counting the present and looking to the future, she has made hundreds of billions. Therefore the war still going on has brought Germany greater material advantages than any war recorded in history has given to a nation.

IV.

If, on the one hand, the war has allowed Germany to make enormous gains up to the present time, on the other it has brought only heavy losses to the Allies, who found themselves suddenly forced to resist her attack.

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that peace were concluded with Berlin on the basis of the "drawn game," which allows of no indemnities. Each one of the Allies would have to bear, without any reduction, the immense expenses which have been incurred to maintain a war imposed on it by Germany.

These expenses have been particularly heavy for exactly opposite reasons from those given above (see II.), which show how little, relatively, the war has cost Germany. Besides, the Allies are bound to take care of and to maintain millions of refugees from invaded regions, whereas the Germans have only temporarily borne such a burden and merely in a small part of eastern Prussia. After the war Belgium, Russia, and especially France will have to provide some tens of billions of francs' worth of extra charges for repairs of the enormous damages done by the Germans in invaded

territories, to private persons, State properties, railways, roads, etc. The Germans would not have a similar outlay, at least not in anything like the same proportion. In their conception of the "drawn game" the Germans certainly reckon that these financial differences would almost insure, after peace, the ultimate impotence of the allied countries with regard to Pangermany.

What, for instance, would be the position of France if a war indemnity were not paid to her? A few familiar figures will enable us to form an opinion on that score. As I have said, in the first three years of the war France has spent about 100 billion francs. As soon as peace was concluded she would need at least 30 billion to repair the enormous damages done to private individuals or to the State; and when the railways, roads, etc., had been put in good order again the total sum expended would probably be about 130 billions of francs. The national debt of France, which before the war amounted to 30 billion, would therefore be at least 160 billion. (This is not counting the fourth year of the war, which will cost at least 36 billion.)

In 1914 the budget of France was, in round numbers, 5 billion francs. After the war, if

only on account of the increased cost of living, this sum must be increased at least 10%; therefore the budget will have a first augmentation of 500 million. Besides, this same budget will have to carry the interest at 5% on the 130 billions of new debt contracted during the war, amounting to an annual payment of 6 billion 500 million. The pensions to be paid to disabled men and to soldiers' widows would add at least 2 billion more. (These figures are probably far below what they would be actually.)

Therefore, the 5-billion budget of 1914 would be almost trebled by the addition of 9 billion, making 14 billion in all. This formidable sum would not leave any funds available for carrying out important social reforms nor for the very considerable improvements which would be necessary in order to bring the economic equipment of France up to the standard necessary for an intensive revival of her economic life.

How would it be possible in France to raise 9 billions of francs each year by additional taxation after a struggle in which her people had been cruelly decimated, and when all her industrial machinery would need complete reorganization? It is clear that the most crush-

ing taxes levied on every person would not suffice to provide such a sum regularly.

Such a situation must inevitably tend to create heavy financial difficulties for the State and for each individual Frenchman. The same would apply to economic undertakings. Thousands of share or bond holders would be in a most precarious condition, as securities would be immensely depreciated. Landed property, overburdened by taxes and seriously affected by the shortage of labor, would lose a great part of its value.

This situation would lead to an enormous general rise in the cost of living, and to unending difficulties which would make the life of every Frenchman well-nigh intolerable.

Now, this financial situation, which is already beginning to exist for the Russians, would also be the lot of the English and the Italians. As to Belgium, Roumania, and Serbia, it is easy to see that the formula "without indemnity," if adopted, would be enough to prevent entirely any reconstruction of those unfortunate countries.

It is upon these immense financial disturbances, which would be still further aggravated by the commercial competition of economic Pangermany (whose efficiency would grow with the

growth of her organization) that the Germans are counting, their object being to reduce the Allies to economic slavery from which there will be no appeal, should peace be concluded on the basis of the "drawn game."

Now, would it not be a monstrous iniquity that the people of France, England, Russia, and Italy should be condemned for tens of years to terrible poverty and to a condition of servitude like that which exists to-day in the occupied territory of France, Belgium, Serbia, etc., simply to gratify the execrable ambition of the Hohenzollerns, and also, no matter what may be said to the contrary, that of the majority of the German people, who, because they have long been Pangermanists, wish to condemn the rest of Europe to slavery? It is the plain truth that only a complete victory can save the allied countries from absolute financial ruin, because Germany alone will be able to pay the costs of the struggle which she has precipitated. As she is responsible for the war she already owes to the united Allies a colossal sum, which may be estimated roundly at between 350 and 400 billions of francs. Even if the credit of the German Empire, *as a State*, is doomed to disappear on the day of her defeat, the material riches of

Germany, which are very considerable, will still continue. Herr Helfferich himself valued them in 1914 at about 412 billions of francs.

Of course Germany will only be able to pay her fabulous debt very gradually. But when means for collecting the German revenues shall have been systematically and attentively studied by the victorious Allies, when these collections of revenue shall have become assured (of course not by written German promises, worthless scraps of paper, but by real guarantees in harmony with those precedents of history which the government of Berlin strongly contributed to establish in 1870), Germany will be perfectly able to hand to each of the great Allied victors about 2 billions of francs a year, while still keeping enough for her own subsistence. This annuity, thanks to modern financial combinations, will be sufficient to allow each Allied State to raise annual loans at relatively low rates and therefore easily procurable, and will permit each State to spare its citizens the burden of taxes which would be not only crushing but fatal and inevitable if it had to relinquish the hope of being recouped for its war expenses by Germany.

Now this solution, which conforms to the most elementary justice, and which, I insist, is

indispensable in order to avert the ruin of the Allied States, which have defended the civilization of the world against German barbarism, would be rendered impossible by a *peace through negotiation*, concluded on the basis of the formula "peace without annexations and without indemnities," which, as can be proved, would practically allow Germany to keep the Hamburg-Persian Gulf and most of her profits from the war.

V.

The Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan, by its mere existence, involves results which cannot be escaped and which must be frankly considered.

1*st*. *The Hamburg-Persian Gulf and Russia.* It must be evident to every sane mind that if an economic and military Central Pangermany, dividing Europe into two parts, should be permanently established, no really independent Russian federal republic could be formed. The results which German agitation has already obtained in Russia suffice to show that the steady threefold pressure—geographic, economic, and military—of Central Pangermany would, from force of circumstances, insure the final success of the Teutonic intrigues having

for their object the disintegration of the vast Russian provinces, according to the plan of Lenine, into a series of republics, which constant anarchy would keep under the permanent influence of German agents. The practical outcome of this state of things from an economic point of view would be the preponderance of Germany's influence in the development of the immense natural riches of European and Asiatic Russia, and from a political standpoint its extension as far as the Pacific Ocean.

German hegemony would thus be expanded, under forms more or less disguised, but nevertheless effective (besides those of Central Pangermany) over the 180 million inhabitants of the present Russia. Therefore 350 millions of human beings, more or less, occupying a vast territory containing inexhaustible mineral and alimentary riches, and geographically controlled by Central Pangermany, would be guided and inspired from Berlin.

2nd. The Hamburg-Persian Gulf and Pan-Islamism. Maintenance of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf would allow the government of Berlin to set on foot a political and military Pan-Islamist movement which would help Germany to consolidate her victory by putting the Allied European Powers entirely at her mercy,

since these hold among their possessions numerous Moslem subjects: France, particularly in Tunis, Algiers, and Morocco; Italy in Libya; Russia in the Crimea and in the Caucasus, in the region of Kazan, in Central Asia, and in Siberia; England in Egypt, in India, in Burma, in the Straits Settlements, and in the greater part of her African colonies.

As Pan-Islamism is ostensibly founded on the restoration and wide extension of the influence and powers of the Sultan of Constantinople, Commander of the Faithful, it could not fail to flatter deeply the neo-nationalism of the Turks, which has manifested itself particularly since the failure of the Allies at the Dardanelles. The result is that, thanks to Pan-Islamists, the Kaiser's interests are well served by the Sultan's Moslem subjects; a clever propaganda has dazzled their eyes with a prospect of the restoration of an empire even greater than in days of old.

No doubt the Moslem insurrection has not become general, but the Islamic agitation has nevertheless yielded local results which will be better understood after the war, and which have hampered the Allies in India, in Egypt, in Libya, and in the French possessions of North Africa.

THE RESULTS IN ASIA OF THE REALIZATION OF THE HAMBURG-TO-THE-PERSIAN-GULF PLAN.

What Germany has already attempted to achieve with the help of Islam should serve the Allies as a severe warning of what she would certainly do in the future if the Hamburg-Persian Gulf should become a permanent reality. There are 18 millions of Moslems in Russia, who are more and more inclined to give ear to the suggestions of Berlin, transmitted by way of Constantinople.

In Persia, in the Azerbaijan, there are about four hundred thousand men who would make very useful soldiers; in Afghanistan five hundred thousand first-class combatants would be found. Once armed they could be let loose in northern India, which contains about 50 million Moslems. These, so far, have collectively remained loyal to Great Britain, but their feelings might be subject to a change if Germany, by remaining mistress of the route from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf, appeared to be victorious. Hence we conclude that very soon after a peace leaving Germany this immense realization, the Pan-Islam movement would allow Berlin to complete the Pangerman plan of colonization in Africa and in Asia; especially in Russia, in India, and, as we shall see, in China.

3rd. The Hamburg-Persian Gulf and China. The German programme of universal domina-

tion has already been extended in China as far as possible. In the first place, the 20 or 30 millions of Moslems who inhabit the Celestial Empire have been wrought upon by Turco-German agents, coming by the way of Persia, Afghanistan, and the old "silk route." Besides, Berlin has employed every imaginable method in order to plunge China into the disorders which now prey upon her, the object of these tactics being to make the Chinese situation so disturbing that in the first place it will absorb the attention of Japan and turn her thoughts from sending her troops into Europe (a question which has already come up, and may still be possible and desirable); and in the second that the state of affairs resulting from these disorders may make it possible, when once the war has been ended on the basis of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf, for Germany to carry out exactly the same political game in China that she has in Turkey.

When that time comes Berlin will say to the Chinese, as she has already said to the Turks: "Your country is completely disorganized; your lives are no longer safe. Now we are bold financiers, enterprising manufacturers, energetic business men. We will help you to turn your country to account. We will procure for

you the experts whom you need. We will give you the means of defending yourselves against your neighbors. We, who are the finest soldiers in the world, will bring up to a proper standard your endless and magnificent military forces, now in embryo. With your 300 millions of inhabitants you can be the absolute rulers of all Asia. We will, therefore, build up for you a formidable army and a very powerful navy."

It is easy to perceive what is hidden behind this programme, with its obvious attraction for the Chinese. In reality, it is a preparation for the seizure by Germany of part of China, and her economic exploitation by Germany precisely in the same conditions and by the same proceedings as those which she has already employed in Turkey with undeniable success.

4th. The Hamburg-Persian Gulf and Japan. The combination of the Pan-Islam movement in Asia, of the splitting up of Russia as far as the Pacific into republics more or less anarchistic and of a policy apparently favorable to China, are for Berlin powerful means of preparing the signal vengeance which Germany intends, after her victory, to inflict upon Japan in the future. No doubt in order to break the union of her adversaries Germany has already

hinted to Tokio the idea of a separate peace, but that is merely a tactical move exacted by the need of the moment. Never would Pangermany, mistress of the route from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf and exercising a predominating influence in China and Siberia, forgive Japan for having driven her out of Kiao-Chau.

Now if an immense Chinese army should be created and put under the direction of German officers, Japan, in spite of the bravery of her soldiers, would at once be unable to avoid the consequences of the intolerable situation in which she would be placed through the relative smallness of her population (70 million, with her colonies) opposed to 300 million of Chinese.

Japan is therefore directly aimed at by the scheme of domination from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf, which seriously endangers her future. Her interest in its destruction is therefore vital and she has every reason to make the greatest sacrifices in order to obtain this end.

VI.

We have noted (see III.) that the profits which Germany has already made in the war, or has insured to herself for the future *if the present conditions are allowed to continue with-*

out essential change, certainly represent hundreds of billions of francs and come from seven principal sources, which are:

1st. The booty amassed from three hundred thousand square kilometres of invaded territory.

2nd. The value of the Pangerman mortgages.

3rd. The value of the monopoly of exploitation in the Balkans and Turkey.

4th. The value of economic Pangermany.

5th. The value of military Pangermany.

6th. The value of the economic profits which the existence of Pangermany gives to Germany at the expense of Russia.

7th. The confiscation of French loans, to the extent of at least 21 billions, either in Russia or in the States which constitute Central Pangermany.

It is important to notice that *only the first of these sources of profit, that is to say, the booty which Germany has won by her invasion of enemy territory, can properly be classed as due to the war;* the other six are entirely due to the creation of Central Pangermany, *and do not come directly from the war, but from the gigantic and not yet understood swindle which the struggle has enabled Berlin to work at the expense of her*

own allies, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, because Serbia has been crushed. The occupation of Serbia is the only positive link which unites the six last sources of profit with the first one, *but this occupation of Serbia by Germany, or, to speak more accurately, by her vassals, is of vital importance to Berlin's plans, for unless Serbia is held, Pangermany must crumble.*

As a matter of fact, geographically speaking, Serbia was a water-tight bulkhead which Germany, already in control of the Austro-Hungarian leaders, was absolutely forced to break down in order to establish her paramount influence in Bulgaria and Turkey. Besides, Serbia is indispensable to the working of the railway from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf, as the Belgrade-Nish-Pirot branch, which runs through Serbia, is an essential part of it. One of Germany's allies, Count Karolyi, acknowledged in the Hungarian chamber of deputies that Germany had made the war for the sake of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf.*

If it were necessary Germany could easily afford to give up her first source of profit, that accruing to her from her invasion of five hundred thousand square kilometres of enemy

* *Le Journal de Genève,* December 30th, 1916.

country, provided she could keep the six other sources which are insured to her by the possession of Central Pangermany, *always provided she retained Serbia* (about eighty-seven thousand square kilometres), as that Serbian territory means the *Pangerman bridge or nexus which is indispensable to the working of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan.* In the minds of the Germans "Peace without annexations or indemnities" is most certainly not meant to apply to Serbia. There have been very clear statements in this regard, evidently made with the consent of the German censorship. The *Kreuzzeitung* declared: "Mr. Lloyd George has said that the restoration of Serbia is an essential condition of peace, and that English honor is involved therein. *The objects of the war for which England is fighting, on the one hand, and Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, on the other, are therefore absolutely contradictory.**

The Hamburger *Fremdenblatt* added: "*Germany and Austria-Hungary have crushed Serbia. It is for them alone to decide what shall be done with the former kingdom of King Peter.*"† The *Volksrecht* of Zurich announced on August 30th, 1917, that a new map of Central Europe

* *Le Matin,* August 14th, 1917.
† *Le Journal,* August 18th, 1917.

had been published in Vienna, showing the annexation of western Serbia by Austria, which agrees with the warning of the *Neue Preussische Zeitung:* "We may be assured that Germany will only make peace according to the war map." *

Let us suppose that, taking advantage of the weariness of the Allies, Germany or her vassals should declare themselves willing to make peace by negotiation, and to guarantee the independence of Serbia. Such a declaration would not change actual conditions. The kingdom of Serbia might exist legally, to be sure, *on paper, but the principle of "no indemnity" would leave her in her present state of utter ruin, which is irremediable unless there should be complete reparation.* Is it possible that if Austro-Germany shall say some day, "All right, I'll give up my claim to Serbia," that the Allies should be taken in by any such grim jest? Besides, what assurance could they have that this promise of evacuation would be carried out at the same time by Germany, Austria, and Bulgaria, in whose governments it is impossible to have the least confidence?

Therefore a peace said to be "by negotia-

* *Le Journal,* August 30th, 1917.

tion," drawn up *on paper*, without real guarantees, might perfectly well respect the frontiers of 1914 *on paper*, and might also respect, *on paper*, the formula "without annexations"; but *in fact* Germany would be left mistress of Pangermany, and would consequently profit in the future by the six sources of enormous profit which she has gained by the war. We may observe that Germany's evacuation of the territory invaded by her in the west and in the east (which we have supposed for the development of our hypothesis) would be only temporary. It would be ignoring completely the tenacity and ambition of the Hohenzollerns to imagine that Germany, once mistress of an empire from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf, would sincerely renounce the ambition of dominating the North Sea and the English Channel. Hence the evacuation of Belgium and the retrocession of Alsace-Lorraine, which on our hypothesis Germany would have yielded to France, would only be for a short time.

If economic and military Pangermany is allowed to exist, the fulfilment of Pangerman plans in the west and in the east would be an inevitable and fatal consequence. Indeed, the commercial competition of economic Pangermany would in itself irremediably ruin eco-

nomic France, England, and Russia, who, having no compensation, would sink under the burden of their colossal war expenses, while to Germany the struggle would have brought gains far exceeding her losses, thanks to her having kept six out of the seven sources of profit won through the war. What could the Allied countries of to-day do if, while they were still exhausted by a disastrous peace, Germany, drawing on the 30 millions of soldiers that Pangermany would put under her orders, should proceed, after a short respite, to seize again, both in the west and east, what she had by our hypothesis) temporarily renounced?

It may then be definitely stated that the formula "Peace without annexations or indemnities" is mendacious in the highest degree, and only a screen for the most formidable of Berlin's snares. If the German people seemed to approve this formula it was because its application would leave the Allies to bear the unprecedented expenses of the war, while it would insure to Germany the enormous profits resulting from the maintenance of Central Pangermany and the Hamburg-Persian Gulf, with great and manifold consequences which would enable her, after a brief pause, to achieve her plan of universal domination.

VII.

It is thus clearly proved that the consolidation of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf is a formidable danger, both to the Allies and to the freedom of the world. The economic and military power which it would give Germany would be so intolerable that those who are fighting for the purpose of putting an end to great armaments would find themselves once more plunged into the vortex of the most rigid militarism, for they could not contend with Pangermany except at the cost of tremendous armaments, which would absorb all their resources and all their attention. Now, would they be in a position to undertake such armaments in the infinitely difficult financial situation in which, according to our hypothesis, they would stand? Would they even have the resolution to undertake them, after the frightful moral disappointment of their peoples, who would learn *too late* the enormous mistake committed by their governments in negotiating for peace on the basis of the so-called "drawn game," which had allowed Berlin to consolidate her Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan? Besides, even if the Allies were willing to attempt once more the overthrow of the atrocious Prussian mili-

tarism, now much more oppressive than before the war, Pangermany would certainly not leave them time to prepare. If the Allies were disposed to renew the conflict they would, in their assumed financial and moral situation, certainly be reduced to impotence before they could get ready to hold their own against the new German colossus.

It is therefore incontestable that France, England, Russia, Italy, the United States, and Japan have a common and absolutely vital interest in this war, far greater than any private interest of their own, which should make them stand firmly, shoulder to shoulder, until the end, in order that the Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan, or, in other words, that odious instrument of oppression, Pangermany, shall be destroyed under conditions which will make its re-establishment impossible forever.

CHAPTER VII.

HOW TO DESTROY PANGERMANY.

I. Why Austria-Hungary is the crucial point of the universal problem presented by the Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan.
II. The thesis of the preservation of Austria-Hungary.
III. The application of the principle of nationalities to Central Europe.
IV. A strong barrier of anti-Pangerman nations can be established in Central Europe, and there only.

I.

In order to understand how to destroy Pangermany, which is the prime necessity of any decisive victory on the part of the Allies, and without which there can be no just or lasting peace, we must study the war as it stretches over Europe, and see what objective, whether geographical, military, or political, is common to all the Allies, the attainment of which would at the same time frustrate the Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan (and therefore Central Pangermany), deal Prussian militarism a mortal blow, and also guarantee permanent attainment of the legitimate personal objectives which each of the Allies has in view as they carry on col-

THE KNOT
OF THE EUROPEAN PROBLEM
RUSSIA
CASPIAN SEA
PERSIA
Persian Gulf
TURKEY
Bagdad
BLACK SEA
ROUMANIA
BULGARIA
Constantinople
AEGEAN S.
SERBIA
GREECE
ALBA
ADRIATIC S.
AUSTRIA
Budapest
Vienna
HUNGARY
ITALY
Rome
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
EGYPT
TRIPOLIS
TUNIS
ALGERIA
MOROCCO
Madrid
SPAIN
FRANCE
Paris
SWITZ.
BELGIUM
GERMANY
Berlin
Hamburg
NETHER-LANDS
NORTH SEA
BALTIC SEA
ENGLAND
London
Petrograd

lectively the formidable war which was forced upon them.

Now, this common objective, this crucial point of all the problems, whether geographical, military, or political, which the Allies must solve is represented by Austria-Hungary, because:

1. That State is only the enemy of the Allies through the Hapsburg dynasty, which, yielding to the injunctions of Berlin, has betrayed its own peoples. In fact, Francis Joseph declared war without even daring to consult his Parliament, for he knew very well that three-fourths of his subjects, sympathizing with Russia, France, and England, and being definitely hostile to Germany, would have opposed, by the voice of their representatives, any bloody struggle destined to turn to the advantage of Germanism. The Emperor Charles I. cannot to-day (for irresistible reasons, financial and military, which make Austria-Hungary the vassal of Germany) conclude peace without the consent of Berlin.

2. It is manifest that Germany cannot maintain a war against Europe without the help of the Austro-Hungarian soldiers whom she has dexterously contrived to enlist in her cause, the vast majority of whom only fight

because they are forced to do so by the brutal German staff-officers who command them.

3. It is clear that after the peace, if Germany were to evacuate all the territories she now occupies in the east and the west, to restore Alsace-Lorraine to France, and yet to keep her hold, more or less disguised, on Austria-Hungary, she would possess all the means for retaking, after a short delay, Alsace-Lorraine from France, since *the German hold on Austria-Hungary inevitably implies the accomplishment of the scheme "from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf,"* which practically puts at the disposal of Germany 30 millions of soldiers, who would represent a formidable power because of their standardized organization under the direction of the Berlin General Staff.

4. From this last consideration it follows that if after the peace Germany were to retain her disguised hold on Austria-Hungary, the solemn promise given by France, England, and Russia to re-establish Serbia in its independence and its integrity would be practically incapable of fulfilment.

5. It is clear that the new Russia could not be really independent if the seizure of Austria-Hungary by Germany were maintained. Besides, on account of the wide extension of

Prussian militarism resulting therefrom, the United States and England would be constrained to keep up the great armaments which they have only adopted temporarily. Belgium would still be imperilled, for the same reason that Alsace-Lorraine would be, even if given back to France for a short time. As for Italy, the German hegemony over Central Europe would mean the end of all her national hopes for the freedom of the Adriatic and for Italian expansion on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean. For Serbia and Montenegro this continued seizure would be a death sentence from which there would be no appeal.

6. On the other hand, if freedom from German control were assured to the non-German peoples of Austria-Hungary after the peace, it would absolutely prevent any aggressive revival of Prussian militarism in the future, for the very effect of that independence would be to take from the General Staff of Berlin troops which are indispensable to the realization of the Pangerman plan. This is shown incontrovertibly by the fact that if it were not for the forces which she draws from Austria-Hungary and Turkey, Germany would not be able to continue the war.

7. A glance at the map on p. 38 will show

that, because of their geographical situation, this independence of the non-German peoples of Austria-Hungary in regard to Germany is the only thing which will enable the Allies to keep their promises toward Serbia and Roumania, and also (by definitely breaking the main axis of the Pangerman scheme, beginning with Bohemia) to eliminate the immense peril of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan. Every ally, without any exception, is most vitally interested in preventing its consolidation.

II.

The liberation of the oppressed Slav and Latin inhabitants of Austria-Hungary would mean the dismemberment of the Hapsburg Monarchy, and would go against the classic formula: "*If Austria did not exist it would be necessary to invent her.*" There was for a long time some reason for this idea, but it has lost its value since the complete seizure by the Hohenzollerns of all the motive power of Austria-Hungary, and consequently of the Hapsburg dynasty, which is intertwined with the constitution of the Austro-Hungarian State. To wish to preserve that State would be to play the German game, for it is practically im-

possible to separate the Hapsburgs from the Hohenzollerns. It would establish the Germanic yoke on the Slav and Latin subjects of the Hapsburgs, thus facilitating the accomplishment of the plan "from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf." More than that, the house of Hapsburg has given such ample proofs of its incapacity, its duplicity, and its readiness to follow even the most criminal suggestions of Berlin that its maintenance at the head of the Austro-Hungarian peoples should not be regarded seriously.

I must add—and I insist strongly upon this point—that this is not only my personal opinion, but also that of those men—few in number but of keen insight—who, for the last twenty years and *upon the spot*, have made a special study of the Central European problem. Among them may be particularly mentioned MM. Louis Léger, professor at the Collège de France; E. Denis and Haumant, professors at the Sorbonne; A. Gauvain, of the *Journal des Débats*, and among Englishmen, Sir Arthur Evans, Seton-Watson, and Wickham Steed, foreign political editor of the *London Times*, who for ten years was the correspondent of that powerful organ at Vienna.

Now, all these experts say as I do that *it is*

absolutely necessary to put the house of Hapsburg —the vassal of the Hohenzollerns—out of commission. The opinion of these experts is of peculiar importance, as they were in a position to study the Austro-Hungarian question under conditions infinitely better than those which fall to the lot of professional diplomatists.

An essential point remains to be proved, for it gives rise to peculiar anxiety in the minds of that part of the public in the Allied countries which still harps on the false idea that Austria-Hungary is a specially German country. This section of the public doubts whether the application of the principle of nationalities, which the Allies demand, would not have the effect of necessarily and considerably increasing Germany by incorporating in it the Germans of the Hapsburg Empire.

It is therefore necessary to demonstrate by means of figures and accurate geographical and ethnographical arguments that this fear is quite chimerical.

III.

On the whole, President Wilson, in common with the Allies, desires the reconstruction of Europe according to the principle of nationali-

ties, a principle which is not founded on race and language, as is too generally believed, but upon *readiness to live together*.

A proof that the principle of nationalities should be so interpreted is furnished by the Swiss, where populations of different races (Germanic and Latin) and of different languages (French, German, and Italian) yet form a clearly distinct nationality.

The *strongly expressed desire* of a group of the population to live in common is moreover indispensable before they should have the right to form a separate State. For instance, in France the Basques and Bretons, who have kept their own peculiar languages, still continue to form part of France. The principle of nationalities is therefore based upon the democratic idea of personal liberty, a conception which spread from France throughout the earth in 1789.

As nothing in this world is absolute, it is clear that the principle of nationalities cannot always receive in practice a complete application. In order to constitute States with a potentiality of life, we must take into account not only the nationalities but also the strategical, defensive, and economical needs of the majority. There are, besides, countries like

Macedonia and certain regions of Austria-Hungary where nationalities are so intermingled that the application of the principle of nationality can only be relative. It also happens that a minority of the population may have to be sacrificed to the good of the majority, even though this minority may be quite alive to its rights. Finally, there are exceptional cases where this principle must give way in the general interests of European peace. Thus, in the Europe of the future, certain strategic regions from which an aggressive is especially possible, should be put out of reach of those Powers to which war is "the national industry."

Having given these explanations and made these reservations, let us see what would be obtained in the main by the application of the principle of nationalities to the German Empire. In virtue of this principle the Germans ought to restore liberty to those peoples who are included by force within their boundaries, that is to say about:

	Inhabitants
Poles	5,000,000
Inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine	1,500,000
Danes	200,000
Total	6,700,000

The Germany of to-day, which numbered 68 millions of inhabitants in 1914, including the non-Germans, would be brought down to about 61,300,000; in round figures, 61 millions of genuine Germans.

But the logical application of the principle of nationalities would give to Germany the power of absorbing those Germans of the Hapsburg monarchy who on historical, strategical, and geographical grounds could be legitimately added to Germany after its reduction from 68 to 61 millions of inhabitants. What would be the result?

Let us look at the map on p. 35, which shows the ethnographic situation of Austria-Hungary.

This map only gives a very imperfect idea of the ethnographic facts, because it is drawn from documents which are German and Magyar, and purposely falsified. In reality the Slav regions are a good deal more extensive than is indicated by the shaded zones.

The following, however, are the results given for the whole of the Hapsburg Monarchy by the official Germano-Magyar statistics in the census of 1910:

AUSTRIA.

	Round figures in tens of thousands
Germans	9,950,000
Czechs	6,440,000
Poles	4,970,000
Ruthenians	3,520,000
Slovenes	1,260,000
Serbo-Croatians	790,000
Italians	770,000
Roumanians	280,000
Total	27,980,000

HUNGARY.

Magyars	10,050,000
Roumanians	2,950,000
Serbo-Croatians	2,940,000
Germans	2,040,000
Slovaks	1,970,000
Ruthenians	480,000
Total	20,430,000

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA.

Serbo-Croatians (orthodox, or Moslems of Serbian origin)	2,000,000

According to these figures, there are 12 millions of Germans in the Hapsburg Empire, but we shall see that not nearly all of these 12 millions could be united to Germany. In fact:

1. As the table shows, rather more than two millions of Germans are in Hungary, where they are scattered in small groups among the

other nationalities. They could not therefore be united to Germany.

2. Out of the 10 millions, roughly speaking, of Germans in Austria, if we deduct those who are intermixed with the Czechs and discount the garbling of Vienna statistics, we may allow that the true number of those who could be geographically incorporated in Germany amounts to not more than seven or eight millions. Let us take this last figure. If these eight millions were incorporated in Germany, then Germany of to-day, reduced for the reasons indicated on pages 131, 132, to 61 millions, would be enlarged, at the expense of Austria, by eight millions of inhabitants. She would then have a total of 69 millions of inhabitants.

Therefore, as the present German Empire had in 1914 a population of 68 millions of inhabitants, we see that the application of the principle of nationalities would allow Germany to gain on the southwest just about the equivalent of what the same principle would take from her on the circumference of the existing Empire.

It is by no means certain that the Germans of Austria would wish to join themselves to the Germans of Germany, but let us suppose it.

Would a Germany of 69 or 70 millions of

genuine Germans be really dangerous for Europe? I do not think so, for, as we shall see, the application of the principle of nationalities would have the effect of withdrawing totally from the influence of Berlin's Pangermanism all the rest of the inhabitants of Austria-Hungary.

In fact, if out of the 50 millions of inhabitants in Austria-Hungary of to-day about 8 millions joined Germany, 42 millions of Austro-Hungarian subjects would remain. Of this number:

Five millions of Poles would join Poland;

Four millions of Ruthenians would join Little Russia;

Three millions of Roumanians would join Roumania;

One million of Italians would join Italy;

Making a total of 13 millions of inhabitants.

There would therefore remain a compact group, composed of 29 millions of inhabitants, made up of Czech-Slovaks, Magyars, and Germans, these last diluted in the solid mass of Magyars and Serbo-Croatians, or Yugo-Slavs. As these last wish to unite with the five million Serbians of Serbia, we thus deduce the presence in Central Europe of a mass of 34 million inhabitants, containing an infinitesi-

mal proportion of Germans, and so situated geographically that they could perfectly well form united States, in which the rights of each nationality and the form of government of each State would be respected, and which, nevertheless, would constitute an economic territory extensive enough to correspond to modern needs.

The obstacle to the creation of such united States might seem to be the reluctance of the Magyars (who at present are playing the German game) to come to an understanding with the neighboring nationalities. This will disappear when the day comes which will make the real Magyar race, now oppressed by a feudal nobility, master of its own fate. It will not then be afraid to consider the possible creation of united States.

In short, we may conclude that there is in Austria-Hungary and in Serbia a mass of 34 millions of inhabitants, who are practically free from Germanic elements and could form in Central Europe a confederacy of States that might in time develop into the United States of Europe.

IV.

The territory of Austria-Hungary therefore contains all the ethnographic elements which would allow of the establishment of new States, constituted on just and durable foundations, and under such conditions that they would form for the future an insurmountable barrier to Pangermanism. It is there, on the road from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf, in Central Europe, that the solution will be found for the formidable problem set to the world by the temporary creation of Pangermany. *We may be absolutely certain that this indispensable solution can be found there, and nowhere else.* Indeed, even without counting her enormous losses of population, Serbia, with her five million inhabitants, could evidently not form a sufficiently effective barrier to Pangermanism, if Austria, still combined with Germany, made a block of 118 millions of inhabitants, all of whose military strength would be entirely at the service of Berlin.

The anti-Pangerman barrier necessary to the freedom of the world can nowhere be organized with such powerful forces as on the territory of what is now Austria-Hungary.

We may be definitely assured that, in order

to break up the scheme of "from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf," and therefore practically Central Pangermany, *it will be sufficient, but absolutely necessary*, that the Slav and Latin peoples of Austria-Hungary shall be definitely freed from the yoke which Berlin has been able to impose on them because of the war. The natural consequence of that freedom will be the almost automatic formation of the three barriers of anti-Pangerman nations of which an idea is given by the map on p. 38.

From the foregoing reflections we may conclude that the Austro-Hungarian question is assuredly the crucial point of the problem, not only European but universal, set before all the civilized States by the creation of Pangermany, which is now an accomplished fact.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE PANGERMAN PLOT.

I. The moral principles of the American people make it their duty to take part in the war.
II. The political interests of the United States oblige them to contribute toward a decisive victory for the Allies.
III. The United States and the Austro-Hungarian question.

I.

The moral obligation of Americans to take part in the war is shown by the Map of the Martyrs. (See map on p. 141.) Not only does Germany constantly violate the laws of war between belligerents, but also and above all the German authorities subject all the civil anti-Germanic populations of the territories now under the Pangerman occupation, *from the North Sea to Bagdad*, to a frightful reign of terror. The sufferings inflicted by the Germans on the French, the Belgians, the Slavs and Italians of Austria-Hungary, the Roumanians, the Greeks, and most of all on the Serbians and Armenians (whom they have caused to be massacred wholesale and systematically by the Turks), represent millions

of unspeakable sorrows, of odious crimes, of cruel martyrdoms. It is clear that the humane principles of Americans cannot allow such prodigious crimes to go unpunished, for that would be to allow of their being repeated and extended to still other countries.

These unheard-of crimes are the result of German imperialism, added to the imperialism of Austria, the feudal imperialism of the Magyars, the Balkanic imperialism of the Bulgarians, together with the neo-imperialism of the Turks, which is based on Pan-Islamism. Now, all these imperialisms have as their foundation the ties which unite, on a basis of Prussian militarism, the autocrats of Vienna and Berlin, whose principles are radically opposed to those of the Allies.

From a moral point of view this frightful war is essentially one of autocracy against democracy, of the feudal spirit against the spirit of the modern world. This being the case, and as the victory of democracy was still in suspense on account of various mistakes, technical, diplomatic, and military, on the part of the European Allies, the United States, by reason of their principles, could not expose universal freedom to so serious a risk by refusing to enter the war.


MAP OF THE MARTYRS
82 millions of human beings
subjected to Pangerman rule, must submit,
according to their countries and to the interests
of Berlin (at the beginning of 1917), to
Requisitions
War contributions
Terrorism
Pillage
Thefts
Outrages
Deportations
Enforced labor
Compulsory military service
Executions
Slow death by famine or sickness
Massacres en masse
Petrograd
Poles and Lithuanians 22,000,000
Danes 200,000
Berlin
Belgians 7,500,000
Ruthenians 5,500,000
Czechs-Slovaks 8,500,000
Vienna
Budapest
Roumanians 8,000,000
Sofia
Constantinople
Bagdad
Armenians 2,000,000
Arabians 8,000,000
Greeks, Ottomans and Levantines 4,000,000
Yougo-Slavs Slovenians, Croatians Serbians, Montenegrenians 11,000,000
French, Alsace-Lorraine combined, 4,500,000
Italians 800,000

II.

The political interests of the United States are deeply involved in the struggle, for four principal reasons:

1st. *The danger of German intrigues in America.*

Citizens of the United States can no longer ignore the ambition of Pangermany toward America, especially in the South American countries, more especially Argentina and Brazil, which are destined, according to the Pangerman plan, to become German protectorates. The manifold and incessant intrigues of German agents during the war, throughout the length and breadth of both North and South America, and particularly in Mexico, where the German plot against the United States was unmasked in the most startling manner, give positive proof of the reality of the Pangerman programme concerning America. It is, therefore, a danger which Americans can only avert by striking at the root of the evil, that is to say, by helping to destroy the basis of Pangermanism, which is Prussian militarism.

2nd. *The intolerable secret German organization in the United States.*

After having established their fundamental plan of 1895, the Germans set themselves the task of making a register of all the German elements, throughout the universe, which

might be capable of helping them to carry out their plan.

The map on this page is drawn up in accordance with the data of map 5 in the *Pangerman Atlas* of Paul Langhans, which gives the result of the register. The map shows

what proportion the Germans born in Germany who had emigrated to the United States bore to the American population about the year 1890. We can see that the proportion was considerable, since at some points (see the map) it amounted to 35 per cent. Further, the general view presented by the map enables us to observe that in the United States the Germans have planted themselves by preference in the industrial and commercial regions of the East and of the Great Lakes. We can therefore understand what followed. Ever since 1900 the *Alldeutscher Verband*, or Pangerman League, in obedience to secret instructions from the official authorities in Berlin, has laid itself out to select from this mass of Germans in the United States all such as might best serve the cause of Prussian militarism at any given moment and at any place, as soon as the European conflagration should break out. Hence, for the last twenty years most of the 10 to 15 million Americans of German birth have been organized. Little by little, in the bosom of the United States there has grown up a veritable State within a State, endowed with the most powerful means of influence. In point of fact, among the German-Americans there are manufacturers, mer-

chants, and bankers of colossal fortunes, who control the lives of hundreds of thousands of workmen or employees living in dependence upon them. As the German-Americans also own many newspapers and have numerous associations, they are able to exert a considerable influence on the policy of the United States, and even to secure the election to Congress of men on whom they can count. The Delbrück law has completed the German organization in the United States, by enabling an influential party of German-Americans to preserve the appearance of American citizens, while at the same time they remain pledged heart and soul to forward the Kaiser's scheme of universal slavery.

A multitude of striking facts—political pressure, monster strikes, plots and outrages planned and carried out by order of the Kaiser's agents, such as Von Papen, Boy-Ed, Von Igel, etc.—have abundantly shown that the German organization in America threatens the independence of the United States, and is of a definitely treasonable character. There is only one way for America to rid herself of this criminal and parasitic organization which the Germans have been able to foster on her soil, and to prevent it from any future growth,

and that is, to make victory certain for the Allies.

3rd. *Berlin's plan for dealing with the United States.*

In 1898, before Manila, the German Rear-Admiral von Goetzen, a friend of the Kaiser, said to Admiral Dewey: "In about fifteen years my country will begin a great war. . . . Some months after we have done our job in Europe we shall take New York, and probably Washington, and we shall keep them for a time. We do not intend to take any territory from you, but only to put your country in its proper place with reference to Germany. We shall extract one or two billions of dollars from New York and other towns."* At the time these words were regarded as mere bluster, but they were connected, nevertheless, with the plan of universal domination which was even then being worked out at Berlin. Besides, a phrase in a letter from Baron von Meysenburg, the German Consul at New Orleans, written on December 4th, 1915, to Von Papen, the German military attaché at Washington who organized the principal outrages in the United States—which letter by the way was seized

* *The Naval and Military Record,* quoted by *L'Echo de Paris,* September 24th, 1915.

by the English—proved that in the minds of Germans behind the scenes the turn of the United States would come after that of the European Allies. The phrase ran: "May the day of the settling of accounts come here also, and when that does come may our government have found again that will of iron without which no impression can be made on this country."*

Finally, William II. himself said to Mr. Gerard, the American Ambassador to Germany: "I shall stand no nonsense from America after the war."† These words from the head of the Hohenzollerns leave no possible doubt that the independence of the United States is directly endangered by the extension of Prussianism.

4th. *The creation of Pangermany.*

Let us consider, as a hypothesis, that the Allies are defeated in Europe. Any one with common sense can see that Germany, with the formidable means at her command, could impose her economic law on South America, would make herself mistress of Canada, and practically dominate the United States, where the German-Americans would help Berlin to

* *Le Temps*, January 17th, 1917.
† *Le Temps*, August 14th, 1917.

carry out the German plan. The freedom of the United States is therefore strictly incompatible with the economic and military existence of Central Pangermany, since the perfection of that organization would give Germany the means of universal domination, and therefore enable her to intervene effectively in the affairs of the United States.

As a result of the new order of things for which Germany is responsible, Pangermany actually represents the present and future danger of the United States. It follows, therefore, that even if the United States do not wish to destroy the Germans as a nation, they should most energetically desire *the destruction of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf scheme and the crushing of that instrument for world-wide oppression, Central Pangermany. That objective is the essential and vital reason why the policy of the United States should be to push the war with the utmost vigor, in order to insure a decisive victory for the Allies.*

If, on the one hand, the United States felt it their duty to enter the war that they might help to put an end to German barbarity and insure the triumph of democracy over despotism, on the other they should now feel that they have a direct personal interest therein,

because any sacrifices, no matter how great they may be, are infinitely less than those which they would be obliged to make later, if, from failure to realize the designs of Germany on America, they should allow her to Pangermanize Europe.

III.

The Interest of the United States.

The personal interest of the United States in the European war consists in the necessity for doing away with Pangermany. As its destruction can only come from a complete reorganization of Central Europe, it follows that the United States has a direct and first-hand interest in also solving the question of Austria-Hungary on the basis of the principle of nationalities, that solution being absolutely indispensable if the world is to see the end of the Pangerman peril, and of great armaments.

CONCLUSIONS.

If in this war the Allies are to obtain the decisive victory which is absolutely indispensable, they must keep three things constantly in mind.

I.

Germany's responsibility for bringing on the war is inexcusable and crushing, since its premeditation by the Prussian Government antedates the outbreak of hostilities by at least twenty-one years.

In the Allied countries the responsibility of the Central Powers for the conflict is usually placed by reference to the diplomatic documents which were exchanged in the weeks immediately preceding it. This process, however, is inadequate, as it only deals with a very short time, and gives Germany an opportunity to wrangle over dates, and even over the hours at which telegrams were sent.

In order that the exact and formidable truth should be known, public opinion among the Allies must be convinced that the Prussian

Government has steadily worked out the Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan ever since 1893, that is to say, for twenty-one years before the war began.

German covetousness of Turkey goes back a long way. In 1896 Doctor Spenger wrote in a pamphlet about Babylonia: "The East is the only country on earth which has not been monopolized by one or other of the great Powers, and yet it offers the finest field for colonization. *If Germany does not let the chance slip, and will seize it before the Cossacks can get hold of it, she will have won the best share of what still remains to be divided in the world.*" * This policy had been advocated by many learned authorities in Germany, but it was William II., soon after he came to the throne in 1888, who first thought seriously of laying hands on Turkey. The oldest proof of practical preparation for this attempt which I have been able to unearth dates back to 1893, but very likely still older ones will come to light when the war is over.

In 1897 a book was brought out in Berlin of which the title-page is here reproduced in facsimile:

* *Deutschlands Ansprüche an das türkische Erbe*, p. 12. Lehmann, Munich, 1896.

KLEINASIENS NATURSCHÄTZE

SEINE WICHTIGSTEN

TIERE, KULTURPFLANZEN UND MINERALSCHÄTZE

VOM WIRTSCHAFTLICHEN UND KULTURGESCHICHTLICHEN STANDPUNKT

VON

KARL KANNENBERG

PREM.-LIEUT. IM THÜRING. FELDARTILLERIE-REGIMENT Nr. 19

MIT BEITRÄGEN

VON

PREM.-LIEUT SCHÄFFER

KOMMANDIERT ZUM GROSSEN GENERALSTAB

UND

ABBILDUNGEN NACH AUFNAHMEN VON HPTM. ANTON (FELDART.-REGT. Nr. 17), HPTM. v. PRITTWITZ UND GAFFRON (INFANT.-REGT. Nr. 93) UND PREM.-LIEUTS. SCHÄFFER UND KANNENBERG.

MIT XXXI VOLLBILDERN UND II PLÄNEN

BERLIN

VERLAG VON GEBRÜDER BORNTRAEGER

1897.

The title of this work is: "*The native riches of Asia Minor; her most important wealth in live stock, minerals, and plants suitable for cultivation.*"

Because of its statements, and the deductions which may be made from it, this book may now be considered as a valuable document. It is a painstaking work, being a very remarkable technical inventory of all the economic resources of Asia Minor. It is illustrated by photographs, the dates on which show that the indispensable researches on the spot were made in 1893. This is proved by the facsimile here given of a photograph (facing p. 154), and also by the allusions to the title-page to be found in the body of the book. Now, this work is due to the collaboration of *five* German officers then in active service:

Karl Kannenberg, first lieutenant in the 19th regiment of field artillery; Captains Anton of the 17th regiment, also of the light artillery, Von Prittwitz and Gaffron of the 93rd regiment of infantry, and First Lieutenant Schäffer *of the Great General Staff*.

We learn from a note on the fourth page of the introduction that the last-named officer went all through Anatolia for the express purpose of making topographical reports.

It is quite clear that this book embodies part of the results of an investigation with which William II. had charged five of his officers. It was certainly not by accident nor for their own amusement that five German officers *in active service* were able to make a long and costly stay in Asiatic Turkey, with all the necessary means for carrying on a very arduous investigation. It is, therefore, incontestable that as far back as 1893, twenty-one years before the war, the German Government sent its officers to study Turkey, not only from a military point of view, but also especially from the standpoint of economics, in order to ascertain the resources in the Ottoman Empire on which Germany might draw, either during peace or in the event of war. Thanks to this precise information, which certainly has not been lost sight of since 1893, Germany has been able to undertake the rapid development of Anatolia, a task which she has pursued with great zeal for the past two years, and which has had an important influence on the evolution of the war.

The German Government in 1893 was that which felt the first forward pressure exercised by William II., who had begun to reign in 1888. We may be sure that if in 1893 it was

Ochsenbespannte Arabâ (zweirädriger Karren) zu Tchepni, einem Gebirgsdorf in einem rechten Seitenthal des Devréz Tchaÿ an den Nordausläufern des Karâkayâ, s. w. Tósia.
Nach einer Aufnahme von K Kannenberg am 9. September 1893.

thought necessary to send five German officers to search out Asiatic Turkey from an economic point of view, it was because the Kaiser himself (and this was proved by his later actions) had made up his mind to find out exactly what Germany might or might not expect to find in the East. Finally, we must notice carefully that prior to 1893 neither the Pangerman plan nor any movement in that direction was known. The formula of "from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf" was as yet unheard of. It is possible to prove, with the help of dates and indisputable facts, that the preparations for the Hamburg-Bagdad railway were the Kaiser's personal work. Indeed, as soon as investigations like that undertaken by the five officers mentioned above had convinced the Kaiser that he could lay his hands on enormous booty by swindling Turkey, he devoted himself to the task energetically, having first paved the way by appearing to yield to popular opinion. It was in 1894 that the Pangerman movement began to take shape, and its development would have been impossible in a country so entirely under police rule as Germany unless it had had the secret support of official authority. It was in 1898 that William II. went to Damascus, and there assured the

Moslems, in a famous toast, of his undying friendship. From Damascus he proceeded to Constantinople, and there he flattered Abdul Hamid, the Red Sultan (then under a cloud on account of the Armenian massacres), so successfully that on November 27th, 1899, the Deutsche Bank of Berlin obtained the necessary concession for the railway to Bagdad. As soon as the news of this concession or *firman* reached William II., his delight over the success of the first step toward the realization of his marvellous dream was so great that it found expression in an ardent telegram to Abdul Hamid.

When he was at Windsor, in 1907, the Kaiser tried in vain to remove England's objections to the Bagdad railway, but in November, 1910, during the Czar's visit to Potsdam, he succeeded in getting the better completely of Nicholas II. Suddenly, on August 10th, 1913, all the Kaiser's preparations were hindered by the peace of Bucharest, and he made up his mind at once to bring on war. As far back as November 6th, 1913, he told King Albert of Belgium at Potsdam that "war was near and inevitable." In April, 1914, the Kaiser, accompanied by Admiral von Tirpitz, paid a visit to the Archduke

Francis-Ferdinand at Konopischt. Now, *it was also in April*, 1914, *according to the statement of M. Radoslavoff himself, that the Kaiser concluded the treaties with Sofia and Constantinople which assured him the military co-operation of Bulgaria and Turkey in the war which he meant to bring on within a short time.**

From this long series of undeniable facts the responsibility of Germany stands out even more clearly than if we only try to prove it from the diplomatic papers which were exchanged in the days just before hostilities began. We may therefore state as did Count Karolyi, one of Germany's allies, that "Germany is fighting for the road from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf." *During twenty-one years Germany prepared all the means necessary to attain this result; therefore, her responsibility is crushing and inexcusable.*

The people of Germany accepted this war enthusiastically, because Pangerman propagandists had convinced them beforehand that it would bring them enormous profits. Maximilian Harden acknowledged this outright in August, 1914, writing in his review, *Zukunft*, at a time when German victory seemed cer-

* Havas despatch, in the *Petit Parisien*, March 26th, 1916; *Le Temps*, April 10th, 1916.

tain: "Why should we make paltry excuses? Yes, we brought on the war, and we are glad of it. We provoked it because we were sure of winning."

"FROM HAMBURG TO THE PERSIAN GULF THE NET IS SPREAD."
PRESIDENT WILSON'S FLAG DAY ADDRESS, JUNE 15, 1917.

To-day the facts are before us. In his Flag Day speech, on June 15th, 1917, President Wilson made the German premeditation and aims admirably clear. "The demands made by Austria upon Serbia were a mere single

step in a plan which compassed Europe and Asia, from Berlin to Bagdad. . . ." The object of Berlin "contemplated binding together racial and political units which could be held together only by force, Czechs, Magyars, Croats, Serbs, Roumanians, Turks, Armenians. . . . These peoples did not wish to be united. They ardently desired to direct their own affairs. . . . And they [the German military statesmen] have actually carried the greater part of that amazing plan into execution! . . . Austria is at their mercy. . . . The so-called Central Powers are in fact but a Single Power. . . . From Hamburg to the Persian Gulf the net is spread."

The map given on p. 158 explains this reality, and German responsibility is once more made clear, this time by geography.

II.

The Allies should constantly bear in mind not only the German occupations of Entente territory, but also the Pangerman seizures which have been made at the expense of their own allies.

In point of fact these seizures are still more serious than the German occupations in the

east and in the west, since, in combination with the occupation of Serbia, they make Germany mistress of Central Pangermany, and thus give Berlin an opportunity to follow out

TERRITORY OCCUPIED BY PANGERMANY AT THE OPENING OF 1917

all the rest of the Pangerman plan in a very short time. The truth of this statement may be proved by reference to the accompanying map or diagram, which shows the total Pangerman occupations in the beginning of 1917.

The Germans themselves attach more importance to their seizures in the southeast at

the expense of their own allies than they do to their occupations in the east and west.

The German review which, considering its character, is so ironically named *Peace*, had in its number of February 1st, 1917, the following avowal: "*In two years of war, Germany has cut for herself, out of an exhausted Europe, an Empire which reaches from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf*" [sic]. "Should the war go on, who dare say that this Empire may not be still further extended by the addition of Greece, Egypt, Holland, and Scandinavia?"*

Doctor Friedrich Naumann, whose propaganda did much toward the creation of *Mitteleuropa*, is a member of the democratic group in the Reichstag. On July 10th, 1917, he voted for the famous formula "Peace without annexations or indemnities," because he well knew, for reasons which I have given in my sixth chapter, that it would allow the Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan to go on unhindered. In his pamphlet, *Bulgaria and Middle-Europe*,† Naumann gave away the secret of the Pangermanizing of Europe by saying: "*Whatever is distinctly national in character, or of a military order, shall be decentralized.*" Which means in

* *Le Matin*, February 28th, 1917.
† Published in 1916, by Reimer, Berlin.

plain language that the old names and frontiers of States would be left unchanged for the present, in order to throw dust in the eyes of the world for a short time, but that all the military forces from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf would be centralized under the leadership of Berlin.

It is this military association of at least 150 millions of men, brought under the orders of Prussian militarism, which makes the very great peril of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan —a peril which sums up all the others representing the outcome of Prussian ambition. That is why President Wilson so justly said in his message to Russia: "*The day has come to conquer or submit.*"

III.

The Allies should so conduct the war that Pangermany shall not only be destroyed, but replaced by territorial conditions which will prevent its recurrence, and which conform to the principles which the Allies have proclaimed.

In their answer of January 10th, 1917, to President Wilson the Allies affirmed: "The civilized world knows that [the objects of the war] imply, in all necessity and in the first instance,

the restoration of Belgium, of Serbia, and of Montenegro, and the indemnities which are due them; the evacuation of the invaded territories of France, of Russia and of Roumania, with just reparation; the reorganization of Europe, guaranteed by a stable régime and founded as much upon respect of nationalities and full security and liberty of economic development, which all nations, great or small, possess, as upon territorial conventions and international agreements, suitable to guarantee territorial and maritime frontiers against unjustified attacks; the restitution of provinces or territories wrested in the past from the Allies by force or against the will of their populations; the liberation of Italians, of Slavs, of Roumanians and of Tcheco-Slovaks from foreign domination; the enfranchisement of populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks; the expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Empire, decidedly alien to Western civilization."

In his message to the Senate on January 22nd, 1917, President Wilson said: "No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere

exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property.

"I take it for granted, for instance, if I may venture upon a single example, that statesmen everywhere are agreed that there should be a united, independent and autonomous Poland and that henceforth inviolable security of life, of worship and of industrial and social development should be guaranteed to all peoples who have lived hitherto under the power of governments devoted to a faith and purpose hostile to their own. . . . I am proposing . . . that no nation should seek to extend its policy over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own policy, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful."

In his message to Russia on June 9th, 1917, President Wilson stated that: "Government after Government has by their [the German rulers'] influence, without open conquest of its territory, been linked together in a net of intrigue directed against nothing less than the peace and liberty of the world. The meshes of that intrigue must be broken, but cannot be broken unless wrongs already done are undone; and adequate measures must be taken


THE EUROPE OF THE PEACE
A scheme drawn up in accordance with President Wilson's basic principle: "I am proposing . . . that no nation should seek to extend its policy over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own policy."
APPROXIMATE POPULATION OF THE PRINCIPAL GROUPS RESULTING FROM THE APPLICATION OF THIS FORMULA
Germany..... 60 Millions Yougo-Slav State..... 11 Millions
Austria..... 7 — Poland..... 22 —
Magyar State 11 — Roumania..... 11 —
Czech State 12 —
NORTH SEA
ENGLAND
NORWAY
SWEDEN
DENMARK
BALTIC SEA
RUSSIA
Petrograd
Riga
Vilna
Niemen
Königsberg
Danzig
Kiel
Brunsbüttel
Berlin
POLAND
Vistula
Cracow
Breslau
Lemberg
Dniester
GERMANY
NETHERLANDS
BELGIUM
LUXEMBURG
Paris
FRANCE
Rhine
Danube
Inn
Vienna
AUSTRIA
Budapest
MAGYAR STATE
BOHEMIA
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
SWITZ.
Prague
Elbe
Oder
Pruth
Dniester
RUMANIA
Temesvar
Danube
Sava
Drava
Bucharest
Sofia
BULGARIA
Constantinople
BLACK SEA
Trieste
Fiume
ITALY
Rome
SERBIA
MONTENEGRO
BOSNIA
DALMATIA
ADRIATIC
Durazzo
Valona
ALBANIA
Salonica
Smyrna
AEGEAN S.
GREECE
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
TUNIS
ALGERIA
CAUCASUS
CASPIAN SEA
ARMENIA
PERSIA
Bagdad
ARABIA
PERSIAN GULF

to prevent it from ever again being rewoven or repaired.

"Of course, the Imperial German Government and those whom it is using for their own undoing are seeking to obtain pledges that the war will end in the restoration of the *status quo ante* out of which this iniquitous war issued forth, the power of the Imperial German Government within the empire and its wide-spread domination and influence outside of that empire. That status must be altered in such fashion as to prevent any such hideous thing from ever happening again."

These quotations enable us to see that the views of the European Allies and those of President Wilson are identical in regard to the remaking of Europe. It is by starting from the principle of nationalities, and by making allowances for the natural contingencies which are inevitable from its application, that we may sketch a map (see map on p. 165) which will conform to the principles laid down by the Allies.

This map does not pretend to give any detailed solution as to the reconstruction of Europe when peace shall have been made, nor to solve the various problems to which the constitution of each State may give rise. The

object of this plan is only to show frankly that the war objectives of the Allies, and the propositions of President Wilson in regard to a just and lasting peace, arrive at the same general conclusion, based on geography. Besides, these conclusions are the only means by which the power of Prussian militarism can be laid low. As a matter of fact, while adhering strictly to the modern principles of justice, they deprive Germany of the regions which are useful to her for strategic offensives, and by the creation of a belt of independent States to the south of her they will take away the man power which alone allows her to continue the war. This is shown by the following statements.

After having conformed to the principles of President Wilson by giving back the territory of Poland, with its six millions of inhabitants, the Danish territory (including the portions necessary to make that source of aggression, the Kiel Canal to the Elbe, international property), which would mean about 500,000 inhabitants, and the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, which number about 1,500,000 inhabitants, Germany would find her population reduced from 68 million before the war to about 60 million more or less.

President Wilson's formula that: "Inviolable security of life, of worship and of industrial and social development should be guaranteed to all peoples who have lived hitherto under the power of governments devoted to a faith and purpose hostile to their own," means the condemnation of the Empire of the Hapsburgs, which is a mosaic of peoples held together in the same State against their will.

Application of the same principle of nationality to Austria-Hungary would scatter five out of her 12 millions of Germans; one into Roumania, three into the Czech-Slovak State, one into the Magyar State. That would leave only seven millions of Germans, which would reduce Austria to its normal limits. We must take into account that this number contains in reality nearly a million of Czechs, who are wrongly classed as Germans in Viennese statistics. Now, would these seven millions of Germans contained in the restricted Austria wish to join themselves to the Germans of Germany? Nothing is less certain, if they still remember the suffering inflicted on them under the hegemony of Berlin, and above all if Austria's economic outlet to the sea is to be assured toward the south.

But let us suppose that these seven millions

of Austro-Germans, invoking the principle of nationalities, do wish to join the 60 million Germans of Germany. That would make 67 millions of Germans, or one million less than before the war. *It is, therefore, not correct to say that to divide Austria-Hungary would be to increase the numerical strength of Germany.* Besides, the seven millions of Austro-Germans would be reunited to a Germany which, *thanks to the application of the principle of nationalities, had lost all the regions which were valuable to her for strategic offensives; Polish territory, the Emperor William Military Canal, and Alsace-Lorraine—all of them regions without which the present German offensive would have been impossible.*

* * *

But I insist that in order to obtain this result, which undoubtedly in its general lines follows the declarations of the Allies, *the liquidation of Austria-Hungary, the vassal of Berlin, is absolutely indispensable.* I have studied the problem of Central Europe from all points of view for more than twenty years, and I affirm that *victory for the Allies is impossible without a complete reconstruction of the centre of Europe on a democratic basis. An independent Poland,*

and also a Czech State, a free Yugo-Slavia, and a democratic Magyar State, are the essential and unavoidable conditions necessary for the destruction of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf scheme, and the creation of a first ethnographic barrier strong enough to prevent any counter-attack on the part of Pangermanism.

Unless these barrier States are formed, there can be no lasting restitution of Alsace-Lorraine to France, Russia becomes the prey of Germany, the forces of Prussian militarism are strengthened tenfold, the whole of Europe is reduced to slavery; and, as a consequence, the freedom of the United States is now actually and directly threatened.